Condo Desperation.....Lehman Offers Money Back Guarantee

Thank god their balance sheet is strong...... :-) . For more insights on Lehman see what Mish has to say Questions Linger Over Lehman's Balance Sheet & April Fool's Offering At Lehman . I also recommend to take a view of the table Level 2 "mark to model" & Level 3 "mark to a hope & a prayer" .

Zum Glück ist deren Bilanz ja bekanntermaßen kerngesund........ :-) Wer mehr zu der "starken" Lehman Bilanz wissen möche wirft am besten einen Blick auf das was Mish zu sagen hat Questions Linger Over Lehman's Balance Sheet & April Fool's Offering At Lehman. Zudem empfehle ich einen kurzen Blick auf die Bilanzpositionen der großen US Banken Level 2 "markt to model" & Level 3 "mark to a hope & a prayer"

Condo Comfort / WSJ
In a move that speaks volumes about the glut in the condominium market, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. is promising some luxury-condo buyers their money back after three years of ownership.

The offer applies to some 200 condo units, priced between $480,000 and $2 million, in West Bay Club , a Lehman-owned resort community in Estero, Fla., near Naples on the Gulf of Mexico.

>Add the news via Calculated Risk and it is no wonder some are getting nervous....... Especially when you have a condo to sell in Miami

> Wenn man dann noch diese Daten via Calculated Risk hinzunimmt sollte es wenig verwundern das einige langsam aber sicher extrem nervös werden..... Das gilt besonders dann wenn man ein Condo in Miami verkaufen möchte

The new building comes on top of unprecedented supply....Lenders of all sizes have $42 billion of condominium debt on their books, according to Foresight Analytics. In just three months -- between the third and fourth quarters of last year -- the delinquency rate rose to 10% from 5.9%, says the Oakland, Calif., research firm.

In an effort to jump-start sales in a skittish market, Lehman says that for every buyer until June 1, it will guarantee that the resort will either sell or buy back the residence at the "full cost of the purchase price three years after closing."

> Charts & Stats via Inventory Tracker from my old friend Soldatthetop and his superb blog Paper Money

Naples, FL Condo Statistics

Current Count: 6863 Historical Low: 5547 Historical High: 7768 Average Range: $500,000.00 - $550,000.00 Median Range: $300,000.00 - $325,000.00 Listed Market Cap: $3,759,455,000.00

Statistics for Naples collected between 07-24-2006 and 04-23-2008

The gamble is that prices will recover during that time, and buyers will hold on to their condos.

A spokeswoman for Lehman said no one was available to discuss details of the guarantee program, which appears to exclude 10 penthouse units in two towers.

Jack McCabe, a real-estate consultant in Deerfield Beach, Fla., said other developers desperate to move unsold condo inventory might have to follow Lehman's lead in offering price guarantees as market values continue to slide and thousands more condo units in Florida come on line this year

> In the end it is probably still better to make this kind of creative offer to move inventory than to wait for things to get better........This will put lots of pressure on other players to match this kind of offer...Not good news for players like disaster stocks like WCI :-) It will be interesting to see how they will manage the accounting..... UPDATE: I also recommend to read this from Mish Condo Credit Squeeze

> Im Endeffekt ist diese Art des Marketings wohl immer noch eine der besseren Möglichkieten die Ladenhüter zu vertickern. Darauf zu warten das sich die Zeiten bessern dürfte extrem langwierig werden.... Das dürfte den Druck auf andere Speiler im Condomarkt erheblich verschärfen....Das dürfte dem übelsten Spieler WCI wohl demnächst den endgültigen Todesstoß versetzen. Man darf gespannt sein unter welchen Punkt solch geartete Geschäfte in der Bilanz auftauchen...... UPDATE: Zum Themenkomplex Condo´s sollte man zudem noch mal einen Blick auf Condo Credit Squeeze via Mish richten

What A Difference A Week Made....Credit Suisse Discovers Another $ 2.85 Bilion "Fair Value Reduction"

As one who has listened to the entire conference call from Credit Suisse just one week ago i can assure you that this will spook the markets. Credit Suisse was besides Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs viewed as one of the big winners during the turbulence. But there was always doubt that their numbers might be too good to be true...... Credit Suisse is proving that this might be the case..... Should be very bad news for the confidence in the marketplace overall...... I assume the "arrogance" from the Credit Suisse management won´t be as obvious as during the last call...... Stock tanking 7 percent......

Als einer der sich vor einigen Tagen die Telefonkonferenz angehört at bin ich mir sicher das diese Meldung hohe Wellen schlagen wird. Bisher galt die Credit Suisse zusammen mit der Deutsche Bank und Goldman Sachs als einer der Gewinner der Marktturbulenzen. In der Vergangenheit sind immer wieder Zweifel aufgekommen ob "die Zahlen nicht zu gut sind um wahr zu sein" ...... Credit Suisse liefert hier eine Steilvorlage für diese Vermutung......Ich bin mir zudem sicher das die "Arroganz" von Seiten des Managements während der nächsten Telefonkonferenz sicher nicht wieder so ausgeprägt sein wird wie letzte Woche .... Aktie zur Eröffnung 7% tiefer......

Thanks to Randy Galsbergen

Credit Suisse Further to its commitment to provide transparency, Credit Suisse today announced that in connection with the operation of ongoing control processes, it has undertaken an internal review that has resulted in the repricing of certain asset-backed positions in its Structured Credit Trading business within Investment Banking.

The current total fair value reductions of these positions, which reflect significant adverse first quarter 2008 market developments, are estimated at approximately USD 2.85 billion (having an estimated net income impact of approximately USD 1.0 billion).

In the first quarter to date, we estimate we remain profitable after giving effect to these reductions. The final determination of these reductions will depend on further results of our review and continuing market developments. We will also assess whether any portion of these reductions could affect 2007 results. Finally, our internal review, which has identified mismarkings and pricing errors by a small number of traders in certain positions in our Structured Credit Trading business, is continuing.

> Here the Full Year Results from Feb. 12th & Webcast

Qatar was maybe a little bit premature....

Sieht ganz so aus als wenn einige Investoren heute leicht erhöhte Temperatur haben werden.....

Qatar fund buys Credit Suisse stake

The QIA’s move comes after Credit Suisse posted robust fourth-quarter results underscoring its resilience during the credit crisis,......

Fundamentals, not liquidity conditions, are behind MBS crash

Good luck to all the banks and especially the monoline insurers that still think that the ABX Indices ( see also The AAA Trap via Sudden Debt ) are not reflecting the market price....... But as long as they can convince the auditors.......

Viel Glück all denen die die immer noch glauben das die ABX Indizes ( siehe auch The AAA Trap von Sudden Debt ) nicht den wahren Wert wiederspiegeln..... Aber solange die Buchprüfer diese Zahlen abnehemen......


Fundamentals, not liquidity conditions, are behind MBS crash / FT
Many banks, if not financial institutions in general, would have you believe that the current rout in mortgage-backed debt is largely being driven by irrational fear. A few bad subprime debts buried around the structured universe are scaring buyers out of markets.

But, said CreditSights, in a note to clients on Wednesday, current pricing levels reflect fundamentals, even for the most highly-rated debt. Mortgage securities across the board are overrated and overvalued:

The harsh truth about the outlook for the AAA tranches - necessary downgrades, if not defaults - should put the lie to the argument that current low prices in AAA RMBS tranches - let alone AAA tranches of mezzanine RMBS CDOs - are somehow the victim of poor liquidity conditions, and do not reflect the true fundamentals of the situation.

CreditSights publish the results of a survey they have conducted on “188 individual relatively large RMBS deals”. The outlook, by all accounts, is grim.

Hat tip to Barry Ritholtz who has also more on this topic Financials: Worse than they look?

Dank an Barry Ritholtz der zum Thema ebenfalls treffendes zu sagen hat Financials: Worse than they look?

At root, CreditSights calculate a severity loss ratio for lenders on individual defaulting subprime mortgages based on mortgage market data collected over the past few weeks. The survey results indicate that such loss severity rates on mortgages are “painfully high”. They range from 24 per cent to 55 per cent - with a weighted average at 35 per cent. And they’re expected to rise. For second-lien mortgages - that is, second mortgages on a property, the loss severity rates average 94 per cent.

> By the way MBIA is on the hook if the losses for their RMBS CDO´s are greater than 22-28 percent.........

> Ganz nebenbei bemerkt ist MBIA ab Verlusten von 22-28 % bei Ihren RMBS CDO´s in der Haftung.....

So how do those figures translate into the capital structure of structured mortgage-backed debt? Foreclosure rates are rising higher and higher - which means the number of occasions when the above loss severity ratios have to be applied are increasing.

And it doesn’t look like the blame can be pinned on any particular vintages of MBS. Here’s a graph of foreclosures on vintages since 2004:

According to CreditSights, that should “up-end the idea that the 2004 vintage was perhaps sufficiently seasoned and composed of loans that had enjoyed enough home price appreciation since 2000, to avoid any further erosion.”

As it is, foreclosure rates are hovering at around 13 per cent on 2005 and 2006 mortgage debt. But CreditSights say there is “no end in sight” when it comes to that figure rising.

Consider then the outlook for delinquancy rates - a measure of mortgage loans not yet in foreclosure, but in trouble:

Add the 7 per cent delinquency rate for the 2006 vintage to the 2006 foreclosure rate at 12.6 and it’s already close to 20 per cent.

How then does that translate into the world of structured finance, and those RMBS tranches?

To trigger a default on the most secure subprime RMBS debt - rated AAA, and structured with a typical 18 per cent attachment rate - foreclosure rates would have to reach the 30 per cent.

As can be seen from the results of CreditSights’ survey, that scenario is indeed becoming “less and less unthinkable”. Adding the foreclosure and delinquancy rates takes us close to 20 per cent. Both are set to increase. Then there’s those painfully low severity loss ratios. Add it all together and that AAA debt is far, far, far from safe.

And we haven’t even mentioned prime tranches lower down the structure.

Far from mispricing RMBS, CreditSights even go so far as to suggest that actually, the ABX indices (which list AAA RMBS debt at around 80 cents in the dollar) are throwing up some pretty appropriate figures.

Goldman:Aug level 3 asset value $72.05B, 7% of total

Add the level 2 component and you have well over 50% of assets that are "not transparent"..... If you want to read more on this issue read Level 3 " Mark-To-Make-Believe Gains" & Level 2 "Mark-To-Model" or surf the labels....

Wenn man jetzt noch die Level 2 Bestandteile addiert kommt man auf satte 50% plus X der Vermögenswerte die nicht transparent nachvollzogen werden können. Mehr zu diesem Thema Level 3 " Mark-To-Make-Believe Gains" & Level 2 "Mark-To-Model" sowie unter den Labeln

Thanks to Bespoke

via Marketwatch Goldman:Aug level 3 asset value $72.05B, 7% of total

...the size of its level 3 assets at the end of third quarter increased to $72.05 billion from $54 billion at the end of the second quarter.

Goldman Sachs said level 2 assets at the end of third quarter amounted to $494.6 billion. There may be some market activity for level 2 assets but the valuations often depend on internal models

Goldman Sachs disclosed that the net unrealized gain on level 3 derivative contracts amounted to $2.62 billion in the third quarter, saying the gains resulted from changes in level 2 reclassification as opposed to level 3 changes

In connection with its lending activities, the firm had outstanding commitments to extend credit of $135.53 billion as of August, compared with $100.48 billion at Nov. 30 fiscal yearend

> Goldman is up 45 per cent since its low on August 15th.......... I´ll stay with gold and the miners......

> Seit dem Tief vom 15.08. hat Goldman u.a. dank dieser Bilanzierung mal eben 45% zugelegt........ Ich für meinen Teil bleibe lieber beim Gold und den dazugehörigen Minen......