Showing posts with label baliout. Show all posts
Showing posts with label baliout. Show all posts

Sunday, September 21, 2008

Hussman "Why On Earth Would Congress Put The U.S. Public Behind The Bondholders? "

I think we all know why........ Too bad that this minor question won´t be raised in Congress...... Should be very good news for the $ and the long term treasury yields ...... Got Gold........ ? I have to apologize for my post title Quote / Joke Of The Day ..... from last week . Should have been titled "Joke Of The Century" from the get-go....... I also recommend to read this Open Letter To Congress On The $700 Billion Paulson Bailout Plan from Mish.

Denke das inzwischen selbst der Blindeste mitbekommen hat das es bei den ganzen Eingriffen alleine darum geht bereits faktisch insolvente Banken auf Kosten der Steuerzahler "rauszuhauen". Bin mir ziemlich sicher das solch unwichtigen Details wie die Haftung der Bondanleger im US Kongress nicht weiter thematisiert werden........ Immerhin dürfte es in nicht allzu langer Zeit dazu führen das der US $ den aktuelen Status als "der Reservewährung" verlieren wird und die Finanzierungskosten der USA dramatisch steigen werden. Evtl. lassen sich ja sogar die Ratingagentuern dazu hinreissen das AAA Rating von US Schulden herunterzustufen. Spaß beiseite......Vorher wird denen sicher die Lizenz entzogen...... Got Gold....... ? Möchte mich hier für meine Postingbezeichnung Quote / Joke Of The Day ..... von letzter Woche entschuldigen . Hätte es gleich "Zitat/Witz des Jahrhunderts" betiteln sollen...... Zudem empfehle ich noch einen Blick in diesen extrem treffenden Open Letter To Congress On The $700 Billion Paulson Bailout Plan von Mish zu werfen.

Hussman In 2006, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted “Everyone knows that a policy of bailouts will increase their number.” This week, Congress is being asked to hastily consider a monstrous bailout plan on a scale nearly equivalent to the existing balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.

As an economist and investment manager, I am concerned that the plan advocated by Treasury is essentially a plan to bail out the bondholders of financial institutions that made bad lending decisions, with little help to homeowners that are actually in financial distress. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. government is contemplating taking on the bad assets of these institutions at probable taxpayer loss and effectively immunizing the bondholders (and shareholders) of these companies.

While it is certainly in the public interest to avoid the dislocations that would result from a disorderly failure of highly interconnected financial institutions, there are better ways for public funds to accomplish this, other than by protecting corporate bondholders while homeowners remain in distress. .......

These institutions are not failing because 95% of the assets have gone bad. They are failing because 5% of the assets have gone bad and they over-stretched their capital. At the heart of the problem is “gross leverage” – the ratio of total assets taken on by the company to its shareholder equity. The sequence of failures we've observed in recent months, starting with Bear Stearns, has followed almost exactly in order of their gross leverage multiples. After Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac went into crisis, Lehman and Merrill Lynch followed. Morgan Stanley, and Hank Paulson's former employer, Goldman Sachs, remain the most leveraged companies on Wall Street, with gross leverage multiples above 20.

Look at the insolvent balance sheet again. The appropriate solution is not for the government to replace the bad assets with public money, but rather for the government to execute a receivership of the failed institution and immediately conduct a “whole bank” sale – selling the bank's assets and liabilities as a package, but ex the debt to bondholders, which preserves the ongoing business without loss to customers and counterparties, wipes out shareholder equity, and gives bondholders partial (perhaps even nearly complete) recovery with the proceeds.
The key is to recognize that for nearly all of the institutions currently at risk of failure, there exists a cushion of bondholder capital sufficient to absorb all probable losses, without any need for the public to bear the cost.
For example, consider Morgan Stanley's balance sheet as of 8/31/08. Total assets were $988.8 billion, with shareholder equity (including junior subordinated debt) of $42.1 billion, for a gross leverage ratio of 23.5. However, the company also has approximately $200 billion in long-term debt to its bondholders, primarily consisting of senior debt with an average maturity of about 6 years. Why on earth would Congress put the U.S. public behind these bondholders?
The stockholders and bondholders of the company itself should be the first to bear losses, not the public. That is the essence of what a free and fair market, and a responsible government would enforce. The investors in the companies that produced the losses should be accountable for them, and the customers and counterparties should be protected.

The case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was special in that government had already provided an implicit guarantee to their bondholders, so that bailout couldn't have been done otherwise without harming the good faith and credit of the government, but it's absurd to tell Wall Street “send us your poor and your tired assets, and we will tend to them.” The gains in financial stocks we have observed in the past two days reflects money that those firms expect to be taken out of the public pocket. .....
In summary, the Treasury proposal to address current financial difficulties places corporate bondholders ahead of the public, rewards irresponsible risk-taking, and sets a precedent for future bailouts. Moreover, we know from a long history of economic experience across countries that a major expansion of government liabilities is invariably followed by multi-year periods of extremely high inflation, particularly when it is not matched by a similar expansion of economic production. Such inflation would initially be modest because of the current weakness in the economy, but could pose unusual challenges to the United States in the coming years.
Congress can benefit the American public by maintaining a focus on responsibly assisting homeowners in distress rather than defending the stockholders and bondholders of overleveraged financial companies. It is essential to recognize that the failure of these companies need not result in “financial meltdown” provided that the “good bank” representing the vast majority of assets and liabilities is cut away, protecting customers and counterparties, so that the losses are properly borne out of the capital base of the companies that incurred them.

Again, everyone knows that a policy of bailouts will increase their number. By choosing who bears the losses for irresponsible decisions at these companies, Congress will also choose the scope of the bailouts that follow.

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Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Sachsen LB " Bailout Is Equal to 25 Percent Of State´s Annual Budget"

Scandal after scandal is creeping up in the German banking province. After the $ 7 billion IKB bailout the Sachsen LB saga is highlighting how far things have gone. But what do you expect when a bank with a € 68 billion balance sheet has off balance sheet vehicles including lots of toxic paper ... And the next possible baliout is already in the making... UPDATE: Guarantee "only" € 2,75 billion, bringing the percentage down to 16 of the budget . And when you put the the purchase price of roughly € 300 million in perspective with the core capital of € 1.5 billion ( latest available figure) the real loss for the Saxony taxpayer is getting worse. Der Spiegel is reporting that the entire risk associated with the SachsenLB which is shouldered somehow via state owned entities is a whopping € 17.5 billion. Here the Bloomberg Version LBBW, SachsenLB Agree on Risks, Pave Way for Takeover

Ein Skandal folgt dem nächsten in der deutschen Bankenprovinz. Nach der staatlichen IKB Infusion von knappen 7 Mrd. $ durch die KfW dürfte bei der Sachsen LB die Fortsetzung folgen. Was soll man auch anderes erwarten wenn es zugelassen wird das eine Bank mit einer Bilanzsumme von 68 Mrd € ausserbilanzliche Verpflichtungen inklusiver Mrd. an Schrottpapieren eingeht . Selbstverständlich ohne von der Aufsicht Bafin belästigt zu werden..... Der nächste mögliche Baliout dürfe uns bald aus dem Westen der Republick drohen.... Update Wie ein sächsischer Regierungssprecher am Donnerstag mitteilte, übernimmt Sachsen eine Landesbürgschaft von 2,75 Mrd. Euro. Wenn man jetzt den Kaufpreise von knapp über 300 Mio € ins Verhältnis zu dem Kernkaital von 1,5 Mrd € ins Verhältnis setzt wird schnell deutlich das der Steuerzahler noch erheblich hat mehr bluten müssen..... Der Spiegel Insgesamt ist das Rettungspaket deutlich größer als die Bürgschaft des Freistaats Sachsen. Finanzkreisen zufolge werden Gesamtrisiken von rund 17,5 Milliarden Euro abgesichert. Diese Risiken sollten in ein neu zu gründendes Vehikel gepackt werden, sagten mehrere mit der Angelegenheit vertraute Personen der Nachrichtenagentur Reuters. Möglicherweise entstehende Verluste von bis zu 2,75 Milliarden Euro werde das Land Sachsen tragen, darüber hinausgehende Verluste von bis zu 6,4 Milliarden Euro übernehme die LBBW. In der nachgelagerten Haftung stünden die anderen Landesbanken mit rund 8,5 Milliarden Euro, hieß es. Die beteiligten Banken lehnten einen Kommentar ab.


The state of Sachsen is forced to guarantee close to € 4.3 billion to complete the fire sale of their state owned ( through several enteties) Sachsen LB to LBBW (another Landesbank). LBBW is threatening to cancel an earlier agreement to buy the troubled Sachsen LB after they have discovered that the losses from the Irish off balance sheet vehicle are far greater than expected. The amount is is equal to 25 percent of Sachsen annual budget! If Sachsen is forced to pay the "claim" the debt per person would increase from € 1000 to € 4.800.

Der Landesbank droht die Schließung / FAZ
Freistaat soll mit einem Viertel des Haushalts bürgen
Die LBBW hat fragwürdige Engagements der Bank und ihrer irischen Tochtergesellschaft Sachsen LB Europe in Höhe von etwa 43 Milliarden Euro ermittelt. Wegen Fehlspekulationen am amerikanischen Immobilienmarkt fürchtet man hier Ausfälle in bisher unbekannter Höhe. Die LBBW will die Sachsen LB deshalb nur übernehmen (hier das Posting von der ursprünglichen Vereinbarung aus dem August), wenn der Freistaat Sachsen für die möglichen Ausfälle in Höhe von mindestens 10 Prozent oder 4,3 Milliarden Euro bürgt. Das entspricht mehr als einem Viertel des sächsischen Landeshaushalts. Träte die Zahlungspflicht ein, würde sich die Pro-Kopf-Verschuldung des kleinen Bundeslandes um etwa 1000 Euro auf 4800 Euro erhöhen.


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Friday, November 30, 2007

Moody's Takes Ratings Action on Six of Citigroup's Seven SIVs

It will be interesting to see if the fire sale to Abu Dhabi will be enough. With all capital ratios plunging and downgrades coming fast and furious i have some serious doubts.... But as long they can pay their dividend and they remain their creativity as shown in No Kidding.... More Off Balance Sheet Vehicles For Citigroup everything is fine....Lets hope for them that this kind of deal won´t backfire like the famous "Liquidity Puts" .... I highly recommend to see this video with the analyst Meredith Whitney and hear her latest thoughts on Citigroup!

Es wird interessant zu sehen sein ob die Notoperation mit Hilfe von Abu Dhabi ausreichen wird. Da momentan alle Kapitalparameter im freien Fall sind und die Downgrades praktisch täglich eintreffen habe ich da so meine leichten Zweifel....Immerhin wollen sie weiter fleißig eine Dividende ausschütten und sind kreativ wie gewohnt wenn es darum geht die Bilanzen zu frisieren ( sieheNo Kidding.... More Off Balance Sheet Vehicles For Citigroup ) . Bleibt zu hoffen das diese Art an Konstruktion nicht wie die "Liquidity Puts" übelst zurückschlägt...... Zudem empfehle ich dringend sich das Video von der Analystin Meredith Whitney die vor einer Woche die große Krise bei Citi ausgelöst hat anzusehen. Es gibt doch noch Hoffnung das nicht alle Analysten vollkommen verblöded sind.

Dec. 1 (Bloomberg) -- Moody's Investors Service may cut the top ratings on six of Citigroup Inc.'s seven structured investment vehicles as part of a review of $130 billion in SIV debt.

The net asset value of the $64.9 billion in Citigroup SIVs dropped to below or near 60 percent, prompting the ratings action, Moody's said in a statement yesterday. The junior notes of three of the funds have been downgraded to below investment grade.

> What a difference afew weeks made....Compare this action with the Fact Sheet Citi-Advised Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) from mid October

> Was für ein Unterschied doch ein paar Wochen ausmachen.....Vergleicht das mit den Aussagen von Mitte Oktober Fact Sheet Citi-Advised Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs)

  • The assets are of very high quality.

  • The SIVs have no direct exposure to U.S. sub-prime assets.

  • The SIVs have approximately $70 million of indirect exposure to sub-prime assets through securities such as collateralized debt obligations. Those securities are AAA-rated and carry credit enhancements.

  • All assets are rated "A" or above; 80% - 90% are rated "AA" or
    above; approximately 50% are rated "AAA"

SIVs, which sell short-term debt to buy longer-term, higher-yielding assets, were shut out of the short-term market as losses on subprime mortgage securities prompted investors to retreat from all but the safest of securities. Unable to finance themselves, three SIVs have defaulted and others are being bailed out by their sponsors. The world's 30 SIVs have more than $300 billion of assets.

``In recent weeks, Moody's has observed material declines in market value across most asset classes in SIV portfolios,'' the ratings company said in the statement.

Moody's said it surveyed 20 SIVs since Nov. 7 and expanded its review after noticing ``significant additional deterioration'' in asset values.

Moody's cut $14 billion in debt in all, mostly capital notes that rank below commercial paper and medium-term notes and are usually the first to absorb losses, Henry Tabe, managing director in charge of structured finance, said in a telephone interview. The ratings company placed $105 billion of debt on review for a downgrade and confirmed the ratings on $11 billion, Tabe said.

Links Finance Corp., a SIV sponsored by Bank of Montreal with $19.1 billion of debt, also had its junior notes cut and may have the remainder downgraded, Moody's said.

`Continued Deterioration'
SIV assets on average are 38 percent financial institution debt, 16 percent asset-backed securities and 12 percent collateralized debt obligations, Moody's said.

The downgrades are ``a reflection of the continued deterioration in market value of SIV portfolios combined with the sector's inability to refinance maturing liabilities,'' Moody's said. Net asset values have slumped to 55 percent from 102 percent in June, Moody's said, including the NAVs of the three defaulted SIVs.

Citigroup, the largest U.S. bank by assets, provided $7.6 billion of emergency financing to the seven SIVs it runs earlier this month after they were unable to repay maturing debt.


Citigroup, based in New York, created the first SIV in 1988 and is the largest manager.

The SIVs' struggle for survival, and the threat of having their assets dumped on the market, prompted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to broker talks with Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. to form an $80 billion "Superfund" to help bail them out.
Centauri, Beta
HSBC this week said it will take on $45 billion of assets from the two SIVs it manages after they were unable to finance themselves. SIVs set up by Dusseldorf- based lenderIKB and London-based Cheyne Capital Management Ltd. defaulted last month after investors stopped buying their asset-backed commercial paper.

Citigroup said in a Nov. 5 regulatory filing that it ``will not take actions that will require the company to consolidate the SIVs.'' The strategy ``remains unchanged from the disclosures in the third quarter'' filing, spokesman Jon Diat said yesterday in an e-mail statement. ``We continue to focus on liquidity and reducing leverage,'' Diat said. Citigroup's SIV assets have dropped to $66 billion from $83 billion on Sept. 30, Diat said.


Centauri Corp., the largest SIV run by Citigroup with $16.9 billion of debt, had its P1 commercial paper rating placed on review for downgrade as well as its AAA medium-term note program, Moody's said. Centauri's net asset value dropped to 60 percent from 85 percent since Sept. 5, Moody's said.

Beta Finance Corp., the second-largest Citigroup SIV with $16 billion of debt, had its senior debt ratings placed on review for downgrade after its net asset value declined to 60 percent from 87 percent, Moody's said.

Sedna, Dorada
Four other Citigroup SIVs, Sedna Finance Corp., with $10.7 billion of debt, Five Finance Corp., with $10.3 billion, Dorada Corp. with $8.5 billion, and Zela Finance Corp., with $2.5 billion, had their P1 commercial paper rating and AAA medium- term note programs placed on review, Moody's said.

Sedna's net asset value dropped to 56 percent, Five's declined to 63 percent, Dorada dropped to 62 percent and Zela's fell to 61 percent. A seventh Citigroup SIV, Vetra Finance Corp., wasn't part of the review.

The capital notes of Dorada, Beta and Centauri were reduced 11 levels to Caa3 from Baa1.

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