Ein neuer und koordinierter Ansatz um die Liquiditätskrise zu lösen. Sicherlich die bisher mit Abstand vielversprechenste Idee. Sollte selbst diese Herangehensweise nicht helfen haben die Zentralbanken wohl ein Problem.......Wenn ich mir die neuen Kriterien für die zu hinterlegenden Papiere angucke kann man schon auf den Gedanken kommen das hier alle guten Vorsätze über Bord geworfen worden sind.......
Fear at the Fed from Floyd Norris NYT (hat tip to Calculated Risk)
...The Fed will lend money to banks based on almost any asset they own, even ones that are not liquid at all. That will include some of the more exotic loans and securities out there.
How much will the Fed lend against illiquid assets? It has a public list, already in use in discount window lending. You will note that it allows the lending of up to 85 percent of the face value of AAA-rated collateralized mortgage obligations, if there is no observable market value. There are some C.M.O.’s out there that have not yet been downgraded but that might not bring that much in a sale.
I’d love to see which assets are pledged, and how much the Fed lends against them. But the Fed won’t disclose those facts. Nor will it let us know which banks borrow using the new facility.
The Fed's New Auction System Minyanville´s Mr. Practical via Mish
So the Fed is considering a “new auction system”. Essentially, what the Fed is doing is taking the stigma away from the discount window--the Fed will lend directly to banks and the banks don’t have to tell anybody. Theoretically, the Fed could make these quiet loans for indefinite periods, thus giving banks more permanent capital (it’s really credit, but banks call it capital).
...this is a bailout,. Nearly all government bailouts take the form of subsidized loans, extending credit at low rates to counterparties or against collateral for which the market would have demanded a high premium. That is precisely what the TAF will do. The Fed's press release claims, of course, that loans will only be available to "sound" banks, and that they will be "fully collateralized". But no one who can get the same deal from private markets will use this facility. The need for the program arises because private markets are skeptical about the soundness of counterparties and the quality of the assets they have to offer as collateral. The Fed hints at this when it mentions the "wide variety of collateral" that can be used to secure loans. You can bet that whatever it is private lenders are eschewing will be pledged as collateral to the Fed under TAF. The Fed is going to bear private risk that the market refuses to. That is a bailout.
to give you an idea of what the Fed will lend, consider a AAA-rated subprime-backed CDO – the kind of thing which is causing billions of dollars in losses all over the financial system. If the CDO has a market price, the Fed will lend up to 98% of that price if it's a short-term CDO, up to 96% if it's medium-term, and up to 93% if it's long-term.
But what if the CDO is completely illiquid, and you can't find a price for it at all? No worries, the Fed will still accept it as collateral, and lend up to 85% of par value. (There's an interesting thought experiment here: what happens if a long-term CDO has a market value of, say, 90 cents on the dollar? In that case, an illiquid version of that CDO would actually be worth more to the Fed than the liquid version.)
Do keep on looking down that list, though: it turns out that banks can even put up as collateral subprime credit-card receivables – they don't even need a AAA rating.
Yves from Naked Capitalism Maybe the Real Reason for the Central Bank (Especially the Fed's) Actions Wednesday has also a very good summary
Yyes von Naked Capitalism hat mit Maybe the Real Reason for the Central Bank (Especially the Fed's) Actions Wednesday ein weitere erstklassige Zusammenfassung an den Start gebracht
Now the roundtrip to the official press releases.
Nun zu den offiziellen Presseerklärungen
BOE
The total size of reserves offered in the operations on 18 December and on 15 January will be raised from £2.85 billion to £11.35 billion, of which £10bn will be offered at the 3-month maturity.
The Bank will accept a wider range of high quality securities as collateral against funds advanced at the 3-month maturity. The additional categories of eligible collateral are:
- Bonds issued by sovereigns rated Aa3/AA- or above (in addition to those currently eligible), subject to settlement constraints.
- Bonds issued by G10 government agencies guaranteed by national governments, rated AAA.
- Conventional debt security issues of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Banking system, rated AAA.
- AAA-rated tranches of UK, US and EEA asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by credit cards; and AAA-rated tranches of UK and EEA prime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
- Covered bonds rated AAA.
BOC Part 1 & BOC
Expansion of List of Securities Eligible as Collateral for Use Under Bank of Canada Standing Liquidity Facility
Under its Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF), the Bank of Canada is prepared to provide liquidity on a daily basis to financial institutions that participate directly in the payments systems operated by the Canadian Payments Association. Loans made by the Bank of Canada must be fully collateralized.
In the context of the ongoing review of the Bank of Canada's collateral policy, begun in the spring of 2007, the Bank has decided to broaden the range of securities acceptable as collateral for use under the SLF to include (i) certain types of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) sponsored by banks and (ii) U.S. Treasuries.
By the end of March 2008, the Bank will expand the list of eligible securities to include certain types of Canadian dollar-denominated ABCP that meet the following general criteria: are bank-sponsored, are covered by a liquidity provision that meets global standards, and are backed by traditional assets of an acceptable credit quality. In addition, higher standards of disclosure and additional credit ratings will be required. Asset-backed commercial paper backed by collateralized debt obligations and other highly-structured assets will not be considered at this time.
Over the next two months, the Bank will consult with financial institutions and other interested parties on the terms and conditions that will apply to ABCP as collateral. By the end of March 2008, the Bank will announce the terms and conditions regarding the use of ABCP as collateral, including the margins that will be applied. The arrangements for accepting U.S. Treasuries as collateral are expected to be completed by mid-2008.
Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, the Federal Reserve will auction term funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral that can be used to secure loans at the discount window. All depository institutions that are judged to be in generally sound financial condition by their local Reserve Bank and that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit discount window program will be eligible to participate in TAF auctions. All advances must be fully collateralized. By allowing the Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility could help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets are under stress.
Alternative Instruments for Open Marketand Discount Window Operations / Fed Page 43
Acceptable discount window collateral generally can best be described as any asset that can confidently be liquidated within a reasonable period of time at the value at which it is accepted.As a general rule, the greater the level of risk associated with a certain type of underlying collateral, the lower the (lendable) valuation assigned to the collateral. Accurately measured, the margins or haircuts used in the valuation process should reflect the true relative risks of the various asset types, and they should contribute to relative asset price neutrality across the broad spectrum of assets deemed eligible for collateral.
Each TAF auction will be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process (subject to a minimum bid rate). The first TAF auction of $20 billion is scheduled for Monday, December 17, with settlement on Thursday, December 20; this auction will provide 28-day term funds, maturing Thursday, January 17, 2008. The second auction of up to $20 billion is scheduled for Thursday, December 20, with settlement on Thursday, December 27; this auction will provide 35-day funds, maturing Thursday, January 31, 2008. The third and fourth auctions will be held on January 14 and 28, with settlement on the following Thursdays. The amounts of those auctions will be determined in January. The Federal Reserve may conduct additional auctions in subsequent months, depending in part on evolving market conditions.
The Eurosystem shall conduct two US dollar liquidity-providing operations, in connection with the US dollar Term Auction Facility, against ECB-eligible collateral for a maturity of 28 and 35 days ECB Eligibility Criteria Collateral The submission of bids will take place on 17 and 20 December 2007 for settlement on 20 and 27 December 2007, respectively. The operational details can be obtained from the ECB’s website (www.ecb.europa.eu). The US dollars will be provided by the Federal Reserve to the ECB, up to $20 billion, by means of a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement (swap line).
SNB $ 4 billion
> The graph for 2007 is only including September. If this pace continues the numbers should be even more shocking.........
Lenders turned to the FHLB as two main sources of funding, short-term IOUs backed by mortgages and mortgage-bond sales, began to dry up in August. That's when losses on securities tied to subprime home loans began to spread throughout the credit markets and investors retreated to the relative safety of Treasuries and their equivalents.
Sales of mortgage bonds, excluding those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have tumbled by 66 percent to a monthly average of $39 billion from $115 billion in 2006, according to Friedman Billings Ramsey Group Inc., a securities firm in Arlington, Virginia.
Some lawmakers said they are concerned the FHLBs are taking on too much debt after they were unable to account properly for their own risks.
Borrowing from the system during that period was probably a record for a two-month span, Vogel said. The FHLBs disclose their borrowing at the end of each quarter.