Showing posts with label leverage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label leverage. Show all posts

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Clevelend Fed "One Measure Of Corporate Leverage Recently Reached A New Historical High"

By now everybody has seen the following chart showing the very impressive cash position of corporates only waiting to be spend on dividends, buybacks, M&A, investments etc..... If you dig a little bit deeper it seems outside a few very strong companies ( mainly tech ) the overall "breath" isn´t quite as strong as reported...... On top of this to my knowledge a not insignificant percentage of the cash is "trapped" outside the US.... Without a special "tax holiday" there is only a very small chance that this money can be used freely..... See 2nd. UPDATE at the end of the post.....

Ich denke jeder hat den nachfolgenden Chart, der die starke Cashposition der US Unternehmen zeigt, inzwischen irgendwo gesehen bzw davon gelesen ( wird ja fast gebetsmühlenartig tagtäglich wiederholt )... Hoffnung der Märkte ist das dieser gigantische Batzen entweden in Form von Investments, Dividenden, Aktienrückkäufen oder Übernahmen den Weg zurück in die Kassen der Anleger und den Wirtschaftskreislauf findet.... Wenn man etwas genauer hinsieht ist ausserhalb einiger extrem starker Unternehmen ( hauptsächlich Technologie ) in der "Breite" nicht alles so rosig wie man allgemein vermuten könnte..... Darüberhinaus ist nach meinem Kenntnisstand ein nicht unerheblicher Teil der Gelder ausserhalb der US "gefangen"..... Ohne eine besondere Steuererleichterung wird keine der Firmen ohne extreme Nachteile ( glaube ca. 30%) über diese Gelder verfügen können.... Habe hierzu noch ein zweites Update am Ende des Postings gemacht.....

US corporate cash FT LEX

American companies are supposedly flush with cash. Therefore, the optimists say, we should own stocks instead of bonds. Bulging balance sheets should lead either to a mergers and acquisitions boom or, less interestingly, companies can always buy back their own stock. Either way, stocks win.

There is one big problem with this argument; in fact, judged in aggregate, corporate USA’s books are in bad shape. The error is looking at gross cash positions only, ignoring the near doubling in non-financial companies’ leverage since 1982.

Some sectors, such as technology, are genuinely cash rich: the members of the Bloomberg World Technology index have a net $260bn salted away, or 12 per cent of their total market capitalisation.

But, in aggregate, non-financial companies’ cash only covers about 25 per cent of the interest-paying debt on their balance sheets, in line with the norm for the past 40 years.

In the 1950s, companies’ cash covered more than half of their debt.

Corporate Cash: Top 20 Firms = $635 Billion Barry Ritholtz

We found that 3,000 non-financial firms have $1.641 trillion dollars in cash and equivalents.

Other details:

-The top 50 firms are over half of this dollar amount, accounting for $823.642 billion dollars.

-The top 20 firms, ranging from Berkshire to United Health Group account for most of this — $635.386 billion dollars.

-The automakers are another anomaly — Ford (at #3) is showing $46.67 billion dollars in cash — but its against $66.668 billion in liabilities. Even GM’s bankrupt stub Liquidation Motors (# 17) is showing $14.194 billion in cash against $73.934 billion in debt.

-I’m not sure if we should exclude Berkshire Hathaway or GE as financials, but they accounted for $146.644 and $111.176 billion dollars respectively.

Is Debt Overhang Causing Firms to Underinvest? Fed Of Clevelend
One measure of corporate leverage, the ratio of firms’ credit market debt to assets, recently reached a new historical high (see figures 1 and 2).

I assume when you include the pension liabilities / funding levels & "Stresstest the Goodwill" the picture isn´t getting better....

Tippe mal darauf das wenn man die massiv unterfinanzierten Pensionskassen miteinbezieht sowie den Goodwill einem Stresstest unterzieht verbessert sich das Bild nicht merklich.....

UPDATE:

Ending The "Cash On The Sidelines" Fallacy (Redux) ZH


iStockAnalyst


The Biggest Lie About U.S. Companies Brett Arends
American companies are not in robust financial shape. Federal Reserve data show that their debts have been rising, not falling. By some measures, they are now more leveraged than at any time since the Great Depression.

MW-AF721_domest_MD_20100802154926.jpg

S&P 500 Full Year Sources And Uses Of Cash ZH
Yet despite consistent claims that companies have massive deleveraged, just $635 billion of debt was repaid, meaning only $35 billion of debt was actually retired! What the flow was used for, however, was to extend maturities, and to shift debt across different sections of the S&P500's balance sheet, lowering the debt cost of capital
I think the charts are showing a nice confirmation that the "breath" is unfortunatley not as strong as would be desirable....

Ich denke diese Charts zeigen leider recht deutlich das die "Breite" leider nicht wie wünschenswert gegeben ist....

2nd Update

Floyd Norris

It was called the “Homeland Investment Act,” and was sold to Congress as a way to spur investment in America, building plants, increasing research and development and creating jobs. It gave international companies a large one-time tax break on overseas profits, but only if the money was used for specified investments in the United States.

The law specifically said the money could not be used to raise dividends or to repurchase shares.

Now the most detailed analysis of what actually happened — using confidential government data as well as corporate reports — has estimated what happened to the $299 billion companies brought back from foreign subsidiaries.


About 92 percent of it went to shareholders, mostly in the form of increased share buybacks and the rest through increased dividends.

There is no evidence that companies that took advantage of the tax break — which enabled them to bring home, or repatriate, overseas profits while paying a tax rate far below the normal rate — used the money as Congress expected.

“Dell was a great example,” she added, referring to Dell Computer. “They lobbied very hard for the tax holiday. They said part of the money would be brought back to build a new plant in Winston-Salem, N.C. They did bring back $4 billion, and spent $100 million on the plant, which they admitted would have been built anyway. About two months after that, they used $2 billion for a share buyback.”

From the B.E.A. data, the researchers were able to calculate that $300 billion in overseas profit was repatriated by American companies in 2005, when they had to pay a tax rate of just 5.25 percent, rather than the normal corporate tax rate of 35 percent. The amount was five times the normal amount of repatriations.

Mmhhh.... After this "spectacular" outcome last time the chances for another tax break are probably not "overwhelming"...

Uh....Nachdem die Ergebnisse beim letzten Mal höflich formuliert "dürftig" waren stehen die Ampeln auf eine ähnlich gelagerte Steuererleichterung nicht gerade auf Grün....

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

"Debt Masking" Not Even Mentioned In Finreg......

Oh Boy...... More on "Debt Masking" in "Surprise, Surprise....." Big Banks Mask Risk Levels - Quarter-End Loan Figures Sit 42% Below Peak

Das nennt man dann wohl brutalst mögliche Regulierung.......Mehr zum Thema wie frisiere ich Bilanzen und "Debt Masking" in "Surprise, Surprise....." Big Banks Mask Risk Levels - Quarter-End Loan Figures Sit 42% Below Peak



Interactive Graph : Masking Risk WSJ

Finreg, the FDIC and repo markets: a BarCap primer BarCap via FT Alphaville

One curious absence in this legislation is the lack of any commentary regarding “debt masking” – that is, using repo transactions to reduce balance sheet at quarter-end in order to report lower leverage.

Given all the (bad) press repo has received lately, we thought there would be more explicit language in the bill regarding such activity.

CHUZPAH!

Thursday, April 8, 2010

"Surprise, Surprise....." Big Banks Mask Risk Levels - Quarter-End Loan Figures Sit 42% Below Peak

At least one has to conclude / "admire" that they have "CHUZPAH"....... Just one more reason for Cramer´s Bull Case For Banks ... You really need a good dose of "humor" & GOLD to stay calm these days....;-)

Vor soviel "CHUZPAH" muß man ehrlich den Hut ziehen....... Ein Grund mehr für Cramer´s Bull Case For Banks .... Heutzutage muß man schon ein sehr "humorvoller" Zeitgenosse & "GOLD-BUG" sein um den tagtäglichen "Wahnsinn" nicht nur kopfschüttelnd zu erleben..... ;-)

Taken from the excellent Randy Glasbergen collection

Big Banks Mask Risk Levels WSJ

Quarter-End Loan Figures Sit 42% Below Peak, Then Rise as New Period Progresses; SEC Review

Major banks have masked their risk levels in the past five quarters by temporarily lowering their debt just before reporting it to the public, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

A group of 18 banks—which includes Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc.—understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42% at the end of each of the past five quarterly periods, the data show. The banks,which publicly release debt data each quarter, then boosted the debt levels in the middle of successive quarters.

The data highlight the banks' levels of short-term financing in the repurchase, or "repo," market. Financial firms use cash from the loans to buy securities, then use the purchased securities as collateral for other loans, and buy more securities. The loans boost the firms' trading power, or "leverage," allowing them to make big trades without putting up big money. This amplifies gains—and losses, which were disastrous in 2008.

According to the data, the banks' outstanding net repo borrowings at the end of each of the past five quarters were on average 42% below their peak in net borrowings in the same quarters. Though the repo market represents just a slice of banks' overall activities, it provides a window into the risks that financial institutions take to trade.

The SEC now is seeking detailed information from nearly two dozen large financial firms about repos, signaling that the agency is looking for accounting techniques that could hide a firm's risk-taking. The SEC's inquiry follows recent disclosures that Lehman used repos to mask some $50 billion in debt before it collapsed in 2008.

The practice of reducing quarter-end repo borrowings has occurred periodically for years, according to the data, which go back to 2001, but never as consistently as in 2009.

The repo market played a role in recent accusations leveled by an examiner in Lehman's bankruptcy case. But rather than reducing quarter-end debt, Lehman took steps to hide it.

Interactive Graph : Masking Risk
UPDATE:

Evidence That Primary Dealers Have Collectively Engaged In Repo 105 And Qtr-End Book Cooking Type Schemes For Years ZH
The graphic representation of the Primary Dealer holdings of net assets shown as a Lo-High range during any given quarter, together with the closing net assets (presented by the red dot), is shown on the chart below.
We are confident that armed with this data, the SEC will be able to provide a prompt and logical response ( JMF : SARCASM AT ITS BEST!) why the PDs have such a peculiar pattern in downshifting their assets toward quarter end, and much more relevantly, who the counterparties are that would consistently take the other side of these quarter end window-dressing trades.

Monday, April 5, 2010

Profit Margins, Margin Debt & Margin Of Error.......

Combine the data points with the excellent When Risk-Return Makes No Sense: How To Deal With An Overvalued Market and it should be clear that Mr. Market is walking on very thin ice now... I must admit that this is my view since September/October......Cannot help but it at least smells a little bit like "Flucht In Sachwerte"... I still think that the risk / reward is far more favourable in GOLD... ;-)

Wenn man die folgenden Daten mit dem extrem lesenswerten When Risk-Return Makes No Sense: How To Deal With An Overvalued Market kombiniert wird klar das man sich momentan auf sehr dünnem Eis bewegt.... Muß gestehen das ich diese Ansicht seit dem September/Oktober vertrete.... So langsam kann man zumindest unterschwellig das Gefühl haben das zumindest in Teilen eine "Flucht In Sachwerte" eingesetzt hat.....Bin mehr denn je überzeugt das in Sachen Chance/Risiko die Aussichten für GOLD weitaus vielversprechender sind.... ;-)

William Hester / Hussman Funds
While earnings growth expectations are steep, sales growth expectations are more modest. Sales-per-share for S&P 500 companies is expected to grow about 5.5 percent this year and about 7 percent next year, according to forecasts. The difference between the growth rates of the top and bottom lines is implies a forecast for sharply rising operating profit margins. The graph below is updated from an earlier piece, and includes forecasts through the end of 2012. It plots the long-term level of S&P operating margins in blue. In red, I've plotted the operating margins currently being forecasted by analysts based on their projections for sales and earnings. Last October, analysts were about half way to pricing in profit margins that matched the record levels of 2007. Now, they are just about there.
David Rosenberg / Gluskin Sheff
As for 2011, the consensus is looking for $97 on S&P 500 operating EPS — we did $95 at the peak of the last cycle when the unemployment rate was at 4.5%, the industry CAPU rate was 81%, private sector credit xpanding at a 16.2% annual rate and nominal GDP at a 4.9% YoY pace.
So the consensus believes that barely two years into the second weakest post-recession recovery in the past six decades that we will actually get back to peak profit levels seems to be a tad outlandish.
Stock Market Rally Explained The Mess That Greenspan Made

Ad in the the Money & Investing section of today’s Wall Street Journal

Factoring in the tight junk spreads right now one must assume that looking at the next chart the "Margin Of Error" is probably "slim"......

Da momentan selbst historisch gesehen recht enge Junk Spreads vorherrschen muß man beim Anblick des nächsten Charts wohl unterstellen das in Sachen "Margin Of Error" wenig "Spielraum" bleibt.....

Investors really ♥ junk. We mean really. FT Alphaville

In most discussions of the high-yield bond market, historical spreads play a major role. But comparing spreads today to those of the past assumes that junk bonds are a constant entity over time. Unfortunately, junk is junkier today, as illustrated by this chart [at left] from last October’s Global Financial Stability Report.

The fraction of CCC or lower-rated bonds approximately doubled from early 2007 to early 2009. And according to a recent report from Fitch, the fraction at the end of 2009 was still 27%.

Debt ranked in the BB category gained 39.1 percent in the past 12 months, underperforming the CCC tier by 66 percentage points, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch index data.


H/T EconomPicData

The "risk trade" is currently clearly not in the early innings....... Looks like the Mantra Bullish. No Matter What & the "Moon Trade" ( brilliant!) is still alive & kicking.... ;-)

Der sog. "Risikotrade" befindet sich sicher nicht mehr im "Anfangsstadium"..... Sieht so aus als wenn das Motto Bullish. No Matter What sowie Ladies and Gentlemen, We Are Trading On The Moon ( brilliant!) momentan noch immer zu greifen scheint...... ;-)+

UPDATE:

PARTS OF THIS MARKET ARE LOOKING IRRATIONAL PragCap

Why Young People Should Buy Stocks on Margin Time H/T Denninger

We just survived the worst debt-fueled binge since the Roaring '20s. Now two professors at Yale University are suggesting we introduce leverage into a new realm of our lives —our retirement portfolios. TIME's Barbara Kiviat asked economists Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff to explain themselves.

You are advocating that people in their 20s and early 30s take all of their retirement savings and buy stocks on margin. Can you explain why that's not as crazy as it sounds?

"It's not as crazy as it sounds because it helps people better diversify risk across time"

Read this twice....

UBS: EQUITY MARKET RISKS APPROACHING EXTREMES PragCap

Irrational Exuberance Is Here: VIX Lowest Since July 2007 As Options Speculation Highest Since Dot Com Days

The VIX has just hit the lowest level since July of 2007 as Sentiment Trader reports that "speculation in the options market has spiked to its highest levels since the spring of 2000."
As i´ve said, not in the early innings.....

Wie gesagt, nicht mehr im Anfangsstadium......

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

The Only Company That Has Managed To Get An Upgrade From Junk To Investmentgrade Is........

Congratulations to Jeff Bezos....... The overall trend that the bondholders ( vs shareholders ) are the new masters will continue for quite a long time & news like this will pop up on a daily basis and "DILUTION" will finally have an effect on stock prices..... Questions from Wall Street Finest about the debt profile, maturities & the balance sheet quality in general were unheard of until 2008..... Up to early 2008 they still have asked how big the next buyback will be ( of course financed with newly issued debt , see "I Want My Buyback Back....")...........

Glückwunsch an Jeff Bezos....... Insgesamt bleibt festzuhalten das der Trend das die Anleihe und Kreditgeber den Kurs der Unternehmen bestimmen ( im Gegensatz wie in den letzten Jahren die Aktionäre ) noch auf Jahre hinaus intakt bleiben wird. Nachrichten wie diese werden zum Alltag gehören und irgendwann wird auch die "Verwässerung" einen Einfluß auf die momentan doch recht losgelösten Aktienkurse haben.......Und ich glaube kaum das Trends wie dieser ( siehe Europäer stürzen sich auf Ramschanleihen & Hochzinsanleihen: Zahlungsausfälle in Europa halten sich in Grenzen ) von Dauer sein werden...... Fragen in Unternehmenspräsentationen von Analystenseite zur Bilanzqualität ( Verschuldung, Fälligkeiten usw. ) habe ich persönlich bis zum Mitte 2008 nicht vernommen..... Bis dahin wurde stattdessen in schöner Regelmäßigkiet nach der Höhe des nächsten schuldenfinanzierten Aktienrückkaufes gefragt ( siehe "I Want My Buyback Back...." & Druckreifer Vergütungsirrsinn ) ........


Amazon.com: An Angel Among Us Deal Journal WSJ
Forty companies have been jettisoned from the ranks of investment-grade credits this year. Just four junk-rated companies have been promoted to investment grade.
The credit changes, tracked by Moody’s Investors Service, show just how much the economy has faltered. It also shows that even healthier high-yield credits will require a much more vigorous economic environment to achieve investment-grade status.

Indeed, three of the upgrades didn’t reflect better economic times, only that the companies had been acquired in mergers. That leaves just one company to receive an upgrade on its business fundamentals. That company is Amazon.com.
“Other than Amazon, what’s missing are upgrades stemming from enhanced fundamentals such as an improved outlook for sales and a widening of profit margins,” said John Lonski, manager director of Moody’s Credit Market Economics. “In an environment like this, acquisition is still the main driver for upgrades.”

Alltel Communications, First Allmerica Financials Life Insurance and Barr Laboratories were acquired by Verizon Communications’ Verizon Wireless arm, Commonwealth Annuity & Life and Teva Pharmaceuticals, respectively. As a result, their bond ratings were upgraded to investment-grade level.

In the most recent quarter, no companies have been upgraded. Moody’s records show the previous record low was two upgrades–in the second quarter of 2008.

Amazon’s second-quarter financial statements reflected “the company’s very strong balance sheet, healthy operating performance, and good liquidity,” according to Moody’s.

As the dollar value of acquired U.S. companies plunged 53% in 2008 and fell 35% for this year through May, Lonski predicted that the potential for more “rising star” upgrades through M&A will keep diminishing.

> Unfortunately i think "good" ( if you want to call the ratio 1:44 good.... ) news like this will be the exception.... Will be interesting to see if at least one media outlet will spin this as a sign that the green shoots are still here....... :-)

> Bin mir ziemlich sicher das solch "gute" ( wenn man das Verhältnis 1 zu 44 gut nennen möchte ) Nachrichten auch weiter die absolute Ausnahme bleiben werden....... Trotzdem nicht ganz auszuschließen das sich zumindest ein Medienvertreter findet der dies als Beleg für den absurden "Green Shoots" Wahn verwendet....... :-)

Monday, April 13, 2009

A Few Goldman Highlights........

More risk, more leverage ( & some kind of "creative accounting" - see end of the post ) ....... Brilliant!

Mehr Risiko, höherer Hebel ( & ein klein wenig "kreative" Buchführung - siehe Ende des Postings ) ..... Hat ja in der Vergangenheit erstklassig funktioniert.... Rechnet man mal die Jahre 2007 und 2008 heraus......


Reuters

A measure of the bank's trading risk, average daily value-at-risk, surged to $ 240 million in the first quarter of 2009, compared with $157 million for the three months ended February 28, 2008, implying that the bank took more trading risk

Goldman also disclosed that it has set aside $168,901 per employee on average for compensation in the quarter, almost 35 percent more than in the first quarter of the previous fiscal year

Bloomberg

Total assets on the balance sheet rose 5 percent from the end of November to $925 billion as of March 27. Of that, about $59 billion qualified as “Level 3” assets, which are the hardest to value, down from $66 billion at the end of November

For more details see Goldman Sachs Press Release

Für weitere Details bitte einen Blick in die Goldman Sachs Press Release werfen.

This from Zero Hedge fits perfectly.....

Diese Beobachtung von Zero Hedge paßt wie die Faust aufs Auge.......

A very interesting data point, also provided by the NYSE, implicates none other than administration darling Goldman Sachs in yet another potentially troubling development. The chart below demonstrates the program trading broken down by the top 15 most active NYSE member firms. I bring your attention to the total, principal, customer facilitation and agency columns.larger/größer

Key to note here is that Goldman's program trading principal to agency+customer facilitation ratio is a staggering 5x, which is multiples higher than both the second most active program trader and the average ratio of the NYSE, both at or below 1x.

The implication is that Goldman Sachs, due to its preeminent position not only as one of the world's largest broker/dealers (pardon, Bank Holding Companies), but also as being on the top of the high-frequency trading/liquidity provision "food chain", trades much more often for its own (principal) benefit

Also on the same topic via EconompicData

Zum gleichen Thema von EconompicData

If Goldman's Selling... Beware of Buying

Goldman's principal trading amounted to 20%+ of all program trading reported on the NYSE, up from between 3-5% one and two years back. In other words, leading up to a period when Goldman may be issuing several billion dollars in an equity offering, their own principal trading has amounted to 4-5x more volume than what had been typical, in an illiquid market, potentially driving up the value of financial equities in the process... interesting.

larger/größer

I think this comment from Jesse´s Cafe Americain nails it....

Ich denke der nachfolgen Kommentar von Jesse´s Cafe Americain faßt es ziemlich gut zusammen......

The bulk of their profit purportedly came from speculative trading for their own accounts, using 'cheap FDIC guaranteed funds.

There will be no recovery in the real economy until the financial system is reformed and banks are restrained into productive functions within our society.

Make also sure you visit this piece from Floyd Norris and his commensts from the conference call ( seeThe Case of the Missing Month ) or this little rant via Barry Ritholtz How to Puff Up Earnings, Goldman Sachs Style.......

Denke das ein Blick in den Kommentar von Floyd Norris zum Conference Call auch nicht schaden kann ( siehe The Case of the Missing Month). Um das "positive" Bild von Goldman abzurunden noch ein kleiner Rundumschlag von Barry Ritholtz ( siehe How to Puff Up Earnings, Goldman Sachs Style )......

Goldman’s 2008 fiscal year ended Nov. 30. This year the company is switching to a calendar year. The leaves December as an orphan month, one that will be largely ignored. In Goldman’s news release, and in most of the news reports, the quarter ended March 31 is compared to the quarter last year that ending in February.

The orphan month featured — surprise — lots of writeoffs. The pre-tax loss was $1.3 billion, and the after-tax loss was $780 million.

No surprise to hear this update on via Norris......

Diese Erläuterung hinsichtlich der Aufsicht im Update von Norris dürfte keine wirkliche Überraschung sein.....

What About That Other $28 Billion?

Goldman Sachs, as you know by now, wants to return that $10 billion in TARP money it got. And what about the $28 billion it borrowed in the credit markets with a guarantee from the federal government?

A spokesman tells me that Goldman has no plans to pay that back early. Nor will it say if it would have been profitable had it reported on the quarter ended in February, as it traditionally has.The spokesman did tell me something I would have included in my earlier Goldman blog had I known it, that the change in fiscal year was required when it converted to a bank holding company.

The bank regulators did not, however, force Goldman to avoid any mention of the December orphan month in the text of its earnings release, instead relegating it to a table deep in the announcement.

> What esle do you expect from a regulator that is labeling a giant hedge fund like Goldman as a bank.... ;-)

> Was soll man auch anderes von einem Regulierer erwarten der einen gigantischen Hedge Fonds wie Goldman Sachs den Bankenstatus zuspricht.. ;-)

Congratulation ( NO SARCASM ) to Goldman for placing the shares at $ 123 Goldman Sachs Raises $5 Billion to Repay TARP Funds The same kind of "creative" accounting in 2008 and the stock would have tanked 50 percent withing a day...... But at least this time it is the so called smart money ( lets hope not too many pension funds are involved.... ) and not the taxpayer on the hook.....Clearly a sign that the euphoria level is close to a peak ( Here is more evidence of some kind of exuberance ) .....

Man muß Goldman zu der Dreistigkeit gratulieren ( Diesesmal ohne Augenzwinkern ). Die haben es tatsächlich geschafft Ihre Aktien zu 123 $ zu platzieren ( siehe Goldman Sachs Raises $5 Billion to Repay TARP Funds ). Hätten die es noch vor einem Monat gewagt eigenmächtig Bilanzierungszeitrahmen abzuändern und so den äußerst verlustreichen Dezember praktisch aus dem Blickwinkel der Öffentlichkeit zu "verbannen" hätte sich die Aktie wohl binnen 24 Stunden halbiert...... Hoffe inständig das es noch weitere Unternehmen schaffen private Gelder mit welchen Methoden auch immer an Land zu ziehen..... Dann ist zumindest der Steuerzahler ( vorausgesetzt die Pensionskassen haben sich zurückgehalten ) nicht allein der Dumme....... Denke das zeigt einmal mehr das die aktuelle Marktstimmung etwas zu euphorisch ist Hier ein weiterer Beleg für eine zumindest "ausgelassene" Stimmung.......

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Tuesday, January 6, 2009

2009 Starts With A New Record......Largest & Fasted LBO Bankruptcy Filing......

At least to my knowledge.....Barely one year after buying the US chemical company Lyondell for $ 19 billion the 3rd. largest chemical company is filing for bankruptcy for 79 of its global affiliates Details via FT Alphaville. According to Breaking News ( no link ) the deal was financed with $ 13 billion of new debt. The major piece was a $ 8 billion bridge loan with a coupon of 9,5 percent...... After the refinancing collapsed ( what a surprise ) the rate jumped to 12 percent..... And some still think the prices for the leveraged loan market are not reflecting the real market prices ( have heard many conference calls from banks that still refuse to mark to market their leveraged loan book "our loan is different...") See update at the end of the post...... This is indeed a perfet example of how much excess has fueled that LBO & Private Equity markets until 2007..... Maybe the CEO from Dow Chemical should read the bankruptcy filing very closely...... The following chart is a good guide that more Chapter 11 filings are on the way and this record won´t last for long............

Zumindest meinem Kenntnisstand nach......Knapp ein Jahr nach der Übernahme des US Chemieunternehmens Lyondell für satte 19 Mrd $ hat das in Rekordzeit zum drittgrößte "hochgezüchtete" Chemieunternehmen LyondellBasell für 79 Tochterunternehmen ( siehe Details via FT Alphaville ) Insolvenz angemelden müssen. Nach Angaben von Breaking News (kein Link) ist die Übernahme seinerzeit mit 13 Mrd $ an neuen Verbindlichkeiten gestemmt worden. Davon satte 8 Mrd $ mittels einer Brückenfinanzierung die zügig refinanziert werden sollte. Wie wir alle wissen ist den Kreditmärkten nach jahrelangem Tiefschlaf ein Licht aufgegangen und die Banken blieben auf Ihren Krediten sitzen. Der Zinssatz dieser Finanzierung ist von seinerzeit 8% auf nun 12% gestiegen. Schon lustig wenn immer noch einige denken das die gehandelten Preise für diese Leverage Loans als übertrieben niedrig betrachtet werden und die Weigerung nach "Mark-to-Markt" zu bilanzieren ständig erneuert werden. Verweise hier auf das Update am Ende...... Bin mal gespannt ob Ackermann & Co ( "Unsere Leveraged Loans sind anders"....sprich besser als der breite Index ) bei der nächsten Präsentation der Abschreibungsrunde in Ihren Kommentaren etwas demütiger werden...... Dieses Beispiel zeigt mehr als eindrucksvoll wie vollkommen irre die Exzesse bis zum Jahr 2007 im Bereich LBO und Private Equity gewesen sind...... Ich hoffe der CEO von Dow Chemical der ja momentan drauf und dran ist einen vergelichbaren Fehler zu wiederholen liest sich das Filing ganz genau durch. Hätte Familie Schaeffer beim Contideal auch gut zu Gesicht gestanden..... Der nachfolgende Chart dürfte einen Vorgeschmack darauf geben was uns an Problemfällen nich erwartet...... Tippe mal das dieser Rekord von LyondellBasell noch in diesem Jahr gebrochen wird..... FAZ Auf die Gläubiger kommen hohe Verluste zu & FT Deutschland Großaktionär flüchtet aus Air Berlin Da benötigt aber einer dringend Kohle um bei Lyondell zu "verbilligen".......

The Boom Went Bust

This chart illustrates further that Private Equity wasn´t the only one that fell in love with debt.... Several listed and former sound companies will pay a very high price for their way to often megalomaniac takeovers and mergers. Just ask Rio Tinto.... They bought Alcan with close to $ 40 billion of new debt just to fend off the BHP Billiton approach ( see Debt Details via FT Alphaville ) A poison pill indeed....... :-)

Diese Übersicht belegt eindeutig das nicht alleine Private Equity dem Wahn des billigen Geldes und unsolider Übernahmen erlegen ist..... Unglücklicherweise wird es auch viele ehemals solide Unternehmen erwischen die Ihre oft wahnwitzigen Megadeals in Cash also neuen Krediten finanziert haben. Fragt mal bei Rio Tinto nach...... Die haben einzig und alleine um die Übernahme durch BHP Billion zu verhindern mal eben für knapp 40 Mrd $ Alcan erworben..... Selbstredend fast ausschließlich durch die Aufnahme neuer Schulden ( Deteils der Verschuldung ...... Das nenne ich mal ne echte Giftpille.......

Jan. 7 (Bloomberg) -- LyondellBasell Industries AF SCA’s Lyondell Chemical unit and some other U.S. affiliates, citing waning demand for their products, filed for bankruptcy in New York.

Lyondell Chemical, based in Houston, has assets of $27.1 billion, debt of more than $19.4 billion and more than 25,000 creditors, according to a petition filed yesterday in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan. Seventy-nine of the company’s affiliates also will file for court protection, including Basell Finance USA Inc., according to the filing. ( see Text via FT Alphaville )

LyondellBasell, one of the world’s largest closely held chemical producers, said it sought protection for its U.S. business because of a “dramatic softening in demand” during the past six months as well as “unprecedented volatility in raw materials costs.” The company said in a statement that it expects a recovery during 2009.

> No word about the massive leverage....... If their recovery plan is based on the assumption that there will be a rebound in 2009 that will last i think it is a safe bet that they are still smoking some of the funny stuff.....

> Schon peinlich wie der Hautgrund, die extrem hohe Verschuldung, nicht erwähnt wird...... Fast genauso peinlich ist die Annahme das sich bereits im Jahr 2009 alles wieder nachhaltig zum besseren wenden wird......

Biggest Creditor
Lyondell’s largest unsecured creditor is the Bank of New York Mellon Corp., as trustee for $615 million in unsecured notes, as well as $241.4 million in unsecured notes in affiliate Millennium America Inc., according to the court filing. LyondellBasell is saddled with $26 billion in debt. Its largest lenders include Merrill Lynch & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Citigroup Inc.

Standard & Poor’s predicted “substantial principal losses for some creditors” of LyondellBasell, analysts led by Frankfurt-based Tobias Mock wrote in a Dec. 30 report.

Petroleos De Venezuela, the Venezuelan state-owned oil company was listed as a third-largest unsecured creditor, with $233.6 million in trade debt.

Lyondell’s Houston Refining unit imported an average of 198,000 barrels a day of crude oil from Venezuela in the first nine months of last year, according to U.S. Energy Department data. The refinery has a contract to buy 230,000 barrels a day of oil from Petroleos de Venezuela, according to a Nov. 13 securities filing. PDVSA, as the company is known, didn’t return a call seeking comment yesterday.

BASF Claim
BASF Corp., based in Florham Park, New Jersey, may have a claim worth $206.4 million under a judgment against the company which is “contingent and disputed,” according to court documents. The company is a unit of BASF SE, the world’s largest chemical producer, based in Ludwigshafen, Germany.

Apollo Management LP, the private-equity firm led by Leon Black, is among Lyondell Chemical’s largest creditors, according to a person with direct knowledge of the matter.

Apollo, based in New York, is a member of a lending group providing so-called debtor-in-possession financing to fund Lyondell’s operations, according to the person, who asked not to be identified because Apollo’s stake hasn’t been disclosed. Steven Anreder, a spokesman for Apollo, declined to comment. Lyondell spokeswoman Susan Moore didn’t return phone calls seeking comment.

Access Industries ( which owns LyondellBasell ) agreed to provide $750 million of the $3.25 billion in loans to fund Lyondell Chemical’s operations during bankruptcy, Access said in a statement distributed by PR Newswire.

Goldman Sachs, Merrill, Citigroup and other banks arranged the financing, which includes $12.5 billion of first-lien bank loans, $5.5 billion of second-lien notes and loans and $2.5 billion of third-lien notes and loans, according to S&P.

> This "so-called debtor-in-possession financing" from Apollo & Co is more like a doubling down......

> Dieses sogenannte "debtor-in-possession financing" von Apollo & Co. ist in Wirklichkeit ein verzweifelter Versuch vom vorherigen Investment überhaupt noch was zu retten......

Bloomberg

Apollo, TPG Inc. and Blackstone Group LP’s GSO Capital Partners were among buyout firms that bought high-yield, high- risk debt last year at discounted prices. The average high-yield loan price fell 28 cents on the dollar last year to 66.6 cents, according to Standard & Poor’s LCD, as Wall Street firms whittled down $230 billion of loans they’d promised to private-equity firms to fund takeovers before credit markets seized up.

“Apollo may be trying to protect an earlier error in judgment with Lyondell,” said Jonathan Macey, a law professor at Yale University. He said Apollo may be trying to avoid deeper losses by providing bankruptcy financing.

Apollo bought Lyondell bank loans from Citigroup in April, bankers familiar with the sale said at the time. Citigroup sold about $1.9 billion of the debt, about a fifth of a $9.45 billion term loan, according to a CreditSights Inc. report on April 29. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co. and the other banks that held the loans offered to sell the debt above 90 cents on the dollar in May, according to a Standard & Poor’s LCD report that month.

> On top of this it wouldn´t surprise me if any of the loans Citi managed to unload are heavily financed through Citi aka the taxpayer..... Wouldn´t be the first time.... ( see UFOs (or Unidentified Financing Objects) & No Kidding.... More Off Balance Sheet Vehicles For Citigroup , & Banks use discounts to tempt ‘vulture funds’ )...... I think this quote “Most of the leverage being provided by banks is only being provided if you buy their loans” sums it up......

> Darüberhinaus würde es mich nicht wundern wenn von den Krediten die losgeschlagen werden konnten die Finanzierung vom selben Haus ( also in diesem Fall Citi oder besser dem US Steuerzahler) bereitgestellt worden ist..... Wäre ja nichts neues.... ( siehe UFOs (or Unidentified Financing Objects) & No Kidding.... More Off Balance Sheet Vehicles For Citigroup & Banks use discounts to tempt ‘vulture funds’ ) ....... Ich denke dieses Zitat “Most of the leverage being provided by banks is only being provided if you buy their loans” spricht Bände.....

$12.7 Billion Merger
LyondellBasell said Dec. 31 that it was considering alternatives, including a Chapter 11 filing, to restructure debt that financed its $12.7 billion merger a year ago.

Lyondell Chemical Worldwide’s 10.25 percent notes due 2010 most recently traded at 16 cents on the dollar yesterday, according to Trace. The Lyondell Chemical unit’s 9.8 percent notes due 2020 traded at 22 cents on the dollar. No quote was available for the 8.375 percent notes due 2015.

Blavatnik’s Stake
Lyondell Chemical is partly owned by Access Industries Holdings LLC in New York, founded by billionaire Len Blavatnik.

LyondellBasell was created in December 2007 by the $12.7 billion acquisition of Lyondell Chemical and affiliate Equistar Chemicals LP by Dutch chemicals company Basell AF SCA. The combination created one of the world’s largest independent chemical producers with 16,000 employees and pro-forma sales of $54.6 billion in the year through September, according to its Web site.

UPDATE on "Mark-To-Market" from leveraged loans.....

Citigroup Cites $2 Billion in Exposure to Lyondell

The exposure, as of Dec. 31, is primarily in Citi's institutional-clients group. The exposure consists of three loans having an original value exceeding $2 billion. Citigroup sold a chunk of the loans last year to private-equity firm Apollo anagement LP and recorded write-downs on the value of the remainder over the course of 2008. That left Citigroup with a marked-down exposure of $2 billion.

Citigroup now is taking a conservative approach by adding $1.4 billion to its loan-loss reserves. That amount assumes Citigroup won't recover any of the loans as LyondellBasell's bankruptcy proceeds.

> Needless to say that i think this kind of high marks on troubled loans is not only common from our old frined Citi.....

> Überflüssig zu erwähnen das ich annehme das diese Art der Kreditbewertung eher die Regel als die Ausnahme ist......

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Sunday, August 10, 2008

Hussman On Phony Mae "This makes Long Term Capital Management Look Like A Conservative Strategy"

If you can stand it i suggest to click through the Fannie Mae Q2 Confernce Call Presentation. Sobering stuff with a management that is still highlighting useless stuff like this one.....

Wenn Ihr die Nerven habt empfehle ich einen Blick durch die Slides der Fannie Mae Q2 Telefonkonferenz Präsentation zu werfen. Ein paar ganz üble Charts sowie ein Management das immer noch auf zu vollkommen nutzlosen Aussagen wie den folgenden beharrt.....

Core capital of $47.0 billion at end of 2008 Q2 is above both our statutory minimum capital requirement, a surplus of $14.3 billion, and the OFHEO-directed minimum capital requirement, a surplus of $9.4 billion.


Compare this one with the reality aka Hussman or Kevin Depew

Vergleicht diese Aussage mit der von Hussman oder Kevin Depew

This is another misleading statement. Technically, based on the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) requirements, both companies have dequate capital cushions. But that's like jumping out of an airplane without a parachute and arguing on the way down over whether your shoes have the right government mandated soles. Yes, according to OFHEO guidelines, Fannie and Freddie have the right soles. But put in context, those shoes aren't going to be of much use when their feet hit the ground without a parachute

Hussman With regard to Fannie Mae's report, the most interesting figure wasn't the reported $2.3 billion loss, but rather the much larger deterioration in the reported fair value of Fannie's balance sheet. We can observe what's going on by comparing Table 32 of Fannie Mae's Q2 2008 10Q filing with the same table in Fannie Mae's Q1 2008 10Q filing.

As of June 30, 2008, the fair value of Fannie Mae's common equity (that is, the book value available to common shareholders) was -$5.39 billion, compared with a March 31 fair value of -$2.07 billion. What's notable here is that this deterioration (-$3.32 billion) was even larger than the -$2.30 billion loss that Fannie reported to investors, which was itself about four times higher than the loss analysts had estimated.
Note that balance sheet losses are excluded from earnings. Financial stocks tend to be reasonably valued when they trade at tangible book value, but simply put, Fannie Mae has no tangible book value. The common stock is now a call option.

Even if we include the fair value of preferred equity, we find that on a fair value basis, Fannie Mae is operating at a gross leverage multiple of 72.7 (total assets comprised primarily of mortgage loans, divided by shareholder equity). In other words, a slight 1.4% deterioration in the value of Fannie's book of assets will wipe out all of the remaining shareholder equity. This makes Long Term Capital Management look like a conservative strategy.


Fannie Bid to Preserve Capital Is Temporary WSJ
Postponing a problem is very different from solving one. Yet Fannie Mae is going to extraordinary lengths to preserve capital -- even trying to forestall big losses by giving essentially free money to delinquent borrowers.

This is a temporary fix that could leave investors with a bad surprise down the road.

In Friday's second-quarter results, Fannie said it made $127 million in loans that allow delinquent borrowers to get current on their mortgages. That prevents Fannie having to repurchase the loans from mortgage trusts at face value and take an immediate charge based on market prices.

In the second quarter, the average markdown for such repurchased loans was 47% and resulted in an overall charge of $380 million. Without the special loans to delinquent borrowers, Fannie might have been forced to buy back 17,901 loans. That could have meant an additional charge of as much as $1.5 billion, based on the losses Fannie took on the mortgages it did repurchase.

Superficially, that isn't a bad trade. Fannie avoids a big extra charge by issuing just $127 million of new loans. The trouble? The special loans have their own cost. Fannie is already carrying the $127 million on its books at just $4 million, meaning it wrote the loans down to about three cents on the dollar.

In its second-quarter filing, Fannie said it expects such special loans "to continue to reduce the number of delinquent loans that we otherwise would have purchased" throughout 2008.

That may preserve capital. But it is really just postponing a problem festering out of investors' sight.

> More comedy from Hank.....Paulson Interview: No Plans to Insert Money in Fannie and Freddie . I´ll bet that during the coming 6-8 weeks the Taxpayerwill be the only one buying the new equity....

> Hier gibt es weitere Aussagen die in 6-8 Wochen vollkommen von der Wirklichkeit eingeholt werden sein dürften......Paulson Interview: No Plans to Insert Money in Fannie and Freddie .

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Wednesday, May 14, 2008

Freddie aka Fraudie Mac / Market Sentiment

It´s always the reaction to the news that is important....And sending the stock higher almost 10 percent on the following news is a clear sign that the complacency has taken over again....A look at the VIX is confirming this view. On top of this Doug Kasshas observed this: "Investors Intelligence bulls are back up to 46, as bears drop to 29.9 -- at respective highs and lows since January". I think this headline via FT Alphaville sums it up nicely Not as bad as feared’ is the new code for ‘buy, buy, buy’ Here are More Reasuring Facts On Phony Mae aka Fannie Mae

Eine der wichtigsten Regeln für Anleger und Trader ist jeweils zu beachten wie der Markt auf bestimmte Nachrichten reagiert. Und wenn man nach den folgenden Neuigkeiten die Aktie fast 10 % nach oben katapultiert ist das für mich ein klares Zeichen das wir uns einem Level nähern der doch langsam wieder bedenklich wird.....Der sich rapide beruhigende VIX unterstreicht diesen Trend. Doug Kass hat diese Statistik die wunderbar zum Gesamtbild passt. "Investors Intelligence bulls are back up to 46, as bears drop to 29.9 -- at respective highs and lows since January" . Diese Schlagzeile via FT Alphaville fasst es ziemlich gut zusammen Not as bad as feared’ is the new code for ‘buy, buy, buy’ Hier gibt es mehr More Reasuring Facts On Phony Mae aka Fannie Mae

Parsing Freddie's Profit Report WSJ
Freddie Mac's earnings report more clearly than ever defined the battle lines between the company's shareholders and the government, which sees it as one of its main tools to bolster the housing market.

The report the mortgage giant issued Wednesday shows that the company's cushion for losses fell sharply in the quarter, giving it one of the weakest balance sheets in the financial sector and leaving it more vulnerable to future hits from the housing crunch.

This weakening in Freddie Mac's financial footing will unnerve politicians keen to see Freddie buy and guarantee even more mortgages to alleviate the credit crunch.

And investors sniffing around Freddie's shares may also want to pay heed to the enervated balance sheet. That is because the company likely will have to sell a large amount of new stock, diluting existing shareholders, to strengthen its balance sheet.

Freddie said Wednesday that it planned to sell $5.5 billion of common and preferred stock. "I think they'll continue to raise capital," said Paul Miller, an analyst at FBR Capital Markets.

The company's weakened state was lost on investors who rejoiced that the loss was smaller than expected and drove its shares up 9%. But the smaller-than-expected loss was primarily the result of accounting changes made in the quarter that allowed the company to book certain gains in earnings and exclude certain losses.

Freddie reclassified $90 billion in securities, boosting profit by about $1 billion compared with the fourth quarter.

Hat tip Calculated Risk

Analyst: There is a headline out there that you have level 3 assets of $157 billion. I was just wondering is that true and is that related at all to the markups of the 1.2 billion gain?

Freddie Mac: No, it is not Paul. We made a determination in the first quarter that given how widely the pricing we were getting on the abs portfolio [varied] that it no longer made sense to leave that into level two. So we essentially moved the entire abs portfolio into level three. We were still using the mean pricing that we were getting from the dealers. So we’re not using a model price. That is all that is. It has nothing to do with the trading portfolio

Another change -- related to its mortgage guarantees -- reduced a potential hit to profit by about $1 billion compared with the fourth quarter. A maneuver that delays taking credit losses also allowed the company to avoid losses in the quarter.

Excluding these and some other accounting changes, Freddie's modest $151 million loss would have been a more worrisome $2 billion.

More insights via Calculated Risk On Freddie Mac Accounting Change

One way to cut through the earnings noise is to go to the balance sheet and zero in on its leverage -- the amount of shareholders' equity Freddie has supporting its $803 billion of assets, which are the loans it has retained.

In the first quarter, Freddie's assets exceeded its $16 billion of shareholders' equity -- its leverage ratio -- by 50.2 times. Fannie's first-quarter leverage ratio was 21.7 times, while the first-quarter average for the 20 largest U.S. lenders was just under 12 times, according to data from SNL Financial.

A Freddie spokesman declined to comment on its leverage specifically. And to be fair to Freddie, some of the market losses that are driving down Freddie's equity may one day be recovered. For instance, equity plunged to $16 billion from $26.7 billion in the fourth quarter, in part because of unrealized losses on securities backed by subprime mortgages.

But if Freddie were a regular bank, its regulator wouldn't let leverage get anywhere close to 50 times. At a nosebleed level like that, the regulator would push Freddie to keep raising capital, even if some of its losses in equity might be fleeting.

Shareholders could sputter about the continued dilution, but the government won't be very sympathetic.

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Thursday, May 8, 2008

Bankruptcies And Defaults Gather Pace

And the "official" recession hasn´t even started yet......

Und das obwohl die "offizielle" Rezession noch nicht einmal begonnen hat.......

Bankruptcies and defaults gather pace FT
The number of companies defaulting on their junk-rated debt and filing for bankruptcy in North America is running at its fastest pace in five years amid the slowing economy and contraction in credit markets.

So far this year, 28 “entities” have defaulted, according to Standard & Poor’s. The defaulted debt of the one Canadian and 27 US companies totals $18.4bn and exceeds the 17 defaults in the US for all of last year

As economic conditions deteriorated...and volatility in the financial markets protracted, corporate casualties began to emerge at a rate unseen in years,” said Diane Vazza, head of S&P’s Global Fixed Income Research Group. “The surge of defaults in the early months of 2008 is the first leg of an extended period of high default occurrences that will characterise the rest of 2008 and 2009.”
> and much much longer......
> und wohl noch wesentlich länger......

S&P said the pace of US defaults in the first five months of the year is the fastest since 2003.

The US is leading the global default rate for companies, said Ken Emery, senior vice-president at Moody’s.

The global default rate for speculative-grade companies rose to 1.7 per cent in April, up from 1.5 per cent in March and a multi-decade low of less than 1 per cent last year, said Moody’s.

Meanwhile, in the US the default rate rose from 1.8 per cent in March to 2.1 per cent in April. Moody’s expects the global default rate to reach 4.98 per cent by the end of the year, with defaults in the US reaching 5.7 per cent. In Europe the default rate is currently 0.7 per cent.
> I assume that we no way near the peak........ Especially when you look at the following table..... The market share of junk in 2007 was even more depressing.....
> Bin mir ziemlich sicher das die aktuellen Zahlen den USA nicht das Ende der Fahnenstange sind.... Das gilt besonders dann wenn man sich die nachfolgende Tablle ansieht...... Für das Jahr 2007 sah das ganze sogar noch depresseiver in Sachen Junkmarktanteil aus......
This week the latest Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer survey highlighted tougher lending conditions from banks to lower-rated corporate borrowers. In spite of the recent rally in credit markets, the number of junk-rated companies trading at highly elevated levels remains well above normal.

“This increases the risks to the weakest links, entities rated B minus or lower,” said S&P. Weak links, which are three times more likely to default than the rest of the speculative grade market, rose to 101 entities in April. This was compared with 78 at the end of 2007 and a 10-year low of 64 in July.

“If the recession is deeper and longer than expected and lending constraints worsen more markedly, the default rate could be significantly more pronounced and severe, possibly reaching 8.5 per cent,” said S&P. Such a rate would reflect 136 defaults.

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Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Bring On The Fire Sales....Whistlejacket one day from MTN default

Finally..... Somebody has to start..... Maybe someone should have told them that it isn´t a good strategy to fund long term maturities with short term debt..... If you combine this with leverage and often enough "questionable" assets you have a recipe for disaster.....

Hat ja auch lange genug gedauert..... Einer muß ja den Anfang machen..... Evtl. hätte denen mal einer sagen sollen das es selten gut geht langlaufende Anlagen mit kurzfristiegn Schulden zu finanzieren....... Wenn man das ganze dann auch noch mit einem zusätzlichen Hebel und häufig genug "fragwürdigen" Papieren mixt bekommt man unweigerlich einne wenig erfolgversprechende Mixtur ( fragt nach bei bei der IKB, West LB, Bayern LB, Sachen LB etc ).....

FT Alphaville So either they couldn’t make it work, or in the end they didn’t want to. Nine days ago, Standard Chartered withdrew the liquidity support promised (conditionally) to its $7bn Whistlejacket SIV, after the vehicle breached its net asset value trigger, and appointed a receiver, Deloitte.

The U-turn by the bank raised the prospect of the kind of rapid firesale - and subsequent contagion through spread-widening across the SIV sector - that banks such as HSBC and Citi have moved to avoid by taking their respective vehicles onto their balance sheets.

On Wednesday, though, Standard Chartered withdrew the proposals it had made to Deloitte to help avoid a wind down of Whistlejacket and expressed its disappointment that it had been “unable to find a viable solution to ensure flexibility for Whistlejacket due to these changes in circumstances.”

This is as a result of a number of factors, including the pace of continuing deterioration in the market for certain asset classes and the impracticality of completing any proposal within the confines of the receivership as it has evolved.
Oh dear. This looks doubly bad. Whistlejacket tripped its trigger because the value of its assets fell below 95 per cent of par - or 50 per cent of the face value of the notes after leverage - triggering automatic receivership and liquidation.
Standard Chartered was thought to have made two offers to Deloitte. Firstly that it could buy Whistlejacket’s assets as they mature and transfer them to a separate vehicle, which it would manage. That though is rather the status quo - and as asset values continue to fall would presumably merely transfer the problem to a new structured vehicle.

> BRILLIANT.......

The second option was that it could buy all of Whistlejacket’s assets at current market prices, which would allow investors to realise what remains of their investments and get them more than in the event of a firesale, but would presumably leave Standard Chartered entirely exposed to the downside of those assets going forwards.

Either way, continuing rapid falls in asset values was going to prove problematic. Moody’s latest update on the SIV sector in January showed how average NAVs had fallen precipitously, the average reaching 52.6 per cent last November. The deterioration has continued apace since then.


While Deloitte say that a firesale is not an option (”absolutely categorically no need“), and that is still seeking other solutions, time is getting tight. The receiver elected last Friday not to pay the medium term notes maturing that day. S&P lowered its rating on the notes to CCC-, and its issuer rating on Whistlejacket, as a result - and said that as the notes have a three-day grace period payment default will take place on Thursday 21. Or tomorrow.

> It looks like the statement via Ft Alphaville SIVs don’t rollover, they die isn´t far off the mark....... And the chart might give an impression what still needs to be refinanced......

> Es sieht so aus als wenn die Aussage von Ft AlphavilleSIVs don’t rollover, they die das ganze recht treffend zusammenfaßt.....Der nachfolgende Chart gibt einen ganz nettenn Überblick über die kommende Refinanzierungswelle die mehr denn je in den Sternen steht......

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Thursday, January 17, 2008

SIVs don’t rollover, they die

Bring on the fire sales ...This should be very bad news for banks that have sponsored these off balance sheet vehicles with funding guarantees...... If they want to avoid the fire sales they need strong balance sheets to shoulder the reintegration..... Ask Citigroup ,IKB , Sachsen LB & Co ....... Once again a big hat tip to FT Alpahville ( see Blogroll )

Notverkäufe ohne Ende..... Das sollte besonders für die Banken unangenehm werden die gr´ßzügig Finanzierungsgarantien für diese Vehikel ausserhalb der Bilanz gegeben haben. Um einen Notverkauf zu verhindern hilft nur noch diese Papiere in die eigenen Bilanzen zu nehmen...... Fraglich ob alle Bilanzen stark genug siind um das zu schultern.....Fragt mal bei der Citigroup, IKB , Sachsen LB usw nach .....Einmal mehr ein dickes Lob an FT Alphaville ( siehe Blogroll)

SIVs don’t rollover, they die FT Alphaville

A quick update on the troubled SIV sector.

The average NAV (net asset value - a ratio of asset-worth to notes after leverage) for SIVs is now hovering just above the 50 per cent mark. According to Moody’s:

A vehicle’s net asset value of capital (NAV) is computed as the difference between the market value of its asset portfolio and the notional outstanding of its senior liabilities, expressed as a percentage of paid-in capital. NAV evolution since 2002 is shown in Chart 2. Sector NAV was above par for most of this period, falling below par in early August 2007 and then declining precipitously to 53% on November 30.


An average NAV that low is very worrying - since in generic SIV structuring terms, a fall below 50 per cent triggers a mandatory and immediate liquidation of the portfolio. Most SIVs are already in defeasance - having broken their “early warning” triggers (NAV at 75 per cent, for example). Moody’s again:

NAVs vary from SIV to SIV primarily as a function of portfolio composition. While SIVs and SIV-lites with relatively large concentrations of Non-Prime US RMBS and ABS CDOs show NAVs below 50%, vehicles with no subprime or ABS CDO exposures have NAVs that are closer to 77% as shown in Table 3. The ongoing liquidity crisis has however demonstrated that NAVs can be affected by spread widening in sectors that are not directly related to US subprime mortgages; thus, vehicles with currently high NAVs may also see sharp declines as contagion spreads across different segments of the credit markets.

(It’s disturbing to note that Moody’s are expecting contagion to spread with some certainty.)

> :-)!

For some SIVs, even a NAV at 53 per cent looks attractive (again via Moody’s):

Today’s rating action is prompted by the decline of Duke Funding’s capital net asset value from 21% on November 23rd 2007 to below zero on January 11th 2008.

This followed the declaration of an Event of Default by Duke Funding on December 6th, 2007. As a consequence of both the NAV decline and the occurrence of an Event of Default, one of the counterparties to the repurchase agreements, holding 8% of the portfolio, has exercised its right to liquidate assets. The remaining four counterparties, holding 92% of the portfolio, have agreed to forebear such liquidation rights on a temporary basis.

We’re now looking at a swift - and potentially market wide - liquidation of SIV portfolios. Possibly along Duke Funding lines. Low NAVs coupled with a spike in maturing SIV debt this January will likely make SIV sponsors - mostly banks - cave into the inevitable and call time. Banks simply can’t afford to keep on rolling-over SIV debt.

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Tuesday, December 4, 2007

LTCM: Lessons Learned? via iTtulip!

I think i know the answer......Too bad that this time the problem is not "contained" to hedge funds......Big hat tip to Rajiv and iTulip for a reminder of this important history lesson of the fall from LTCM

Ich glaube die Antwort zu kenne......Dumm nur das heutzutage nicht nur die Hedge Fonds betroffen sind....Großes Kompliment an Rajiv und iTulip um uns dieses "Mißgeschick" mit dem Namen LTCM in Erinnerung zu rufen



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Thursday, November 8, 2007

Deutsche Bank Buybacks & Foreclosures

I just couldn´t resist. Every time we hear the phrase "buyback" the stock jumps. It doesn´t matter if these buybacks will occur or not. I have been stumbling on a review of what the buybacks have done for the shareholders of Deutsche Bank. Taking todays share price they buybacks have resulted in a loss of over $ 350 mio. So far....... I assume that their focus now that the shares are trading around 85 and 30 percent of the peak is to preserve their core capital ...... Nice timing!

Da konnte ich einfach nicht wiederstehen. Jedesmal wenn der Begriff "Aktienrückkauf" in den Mund genimmen wird steigen in der Regel die Aktien. Und das unanhängig davon ob diese Käufe auch jemals durchgeführt werden. Ich bin in den letzten Tagen auf diese Betrachtung der Rückkäufe durch die Deutsche Bank gestolpert. Und basierend auf dem aktuellen Preis sieht es ganz so aus als wenn hier mal eben 250 Mio € " nicht optimal and die Aktionäre zurückgegeben worden sind. Bisher....... Und ich kann mir sehr gut vorstellen das da der Aktienkurs knappe 20% vom Durchschnittskurs und ca. 30 % from Hoch zurückgekommen ist der Focus jetzt eher auf die Stärkung des Kernkapitals liegt...... Tolles Timing!

And when looking at the following graphs and other charts from their analyst presentation i think they already regret some of the buybacks .....

Und wenn man sich die nachfolgenden Grafiken und die Chart der Analystenpräsentationansieht bin ich mir ziemlich sicher das Sie einige der Aktienrückkäufe schon bereuen....

Foreclosure wave sweeps America / BBC
Cleveland, Ohio, is an industrial city on the banks of Lake Erie in the US "rust belt".

It is the sub-prime capital of the United States. One in ten homes in the city is now vacant, and whole neighbourhoods have been blighted by foreclosed, vandalized and boarded-up homes.

THE SUB-PRIME CRISIS IN CLEVELAND / Interactive Map

Many of these homes are now owned by the banks and investment pools owning the mortgages, and the company making the most foreclosures in Cleveland is Deutsche Bank Trust, which acts on behalf of such investment

Next comes a raher grim view from Citi via the FT

Nachfolgend ein recht kritischer Bericht von der Citigroup via der FT

Beware the “uber leveraged” trio — Barclays, RBS and Deutsche

Research by Citi’s Simon Samuels suggests that, depending on the measure used, Europe’s banks need to fix capital deficits that run as high as 20 per cent - on average!

Most strikingly, however, are Europe’s “uber leveraged” trio — Barclays, RBS and Deutsche Bank — where capital deficits range from 60% to 80% of market cap.

To put this graph into perspective you have to click here .... The graph above shows the enlarged version of the right scale....

Um diese Grafik ins Verhältnis zu setzen ist ein Blick auf diesen Chart empfehlenswert....Mein vergrößerter Ausschnitt zeigt den rechten Teil der Skala.....

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