I Want My Buyback Back..... Washington Mutual Edition Part II

They really should have hired Homer or Paris Hilton to run the company.... No joke! After attending the conference call back in Jan 07 ( see Flashback January 2007 ) even the dumbest outside Wall Street could have predicted this outcome. Here is more from Mish . Mish has done another update WaMu Raises Cash, Skeptical Eyebrows

Denke Homer oder Paris Hilton hätten das besser hinbekommen....... Traurig aber wahr! Jeder der wie ich im Januar 2007 ( siehe Flashback January 2007 ) sich den Call angetan hat konnte genau das vorhersehen. Voraussetzung natürlich man arbeitet nicht an der Wall Street......Hier gibt es mehr von Mish . Hier ein weiteres lesenswertes ein Update WaMu Raises Cash, Skeptical Eyebrows von ihm.

Flashback January 2007

On Jan. 3, 2007, the company entered into an accelerated share repurchase agreement with a dealer, buying back $2.7 billion of its common stock ( Stock close to $ 40 )

Fast forward April 2008 Washington Mutual Gets $7 Billion From TPG-Led Group

Wahington Mutual the largest U.S. savings and loan, got $7 billion from a group of investors led by David Bonderman's TPG Inc. after losses on subprime loans ate up capital and erased 74 percent of its market value.

Washington Mutual sold 176 million shares at $8.75 a piece, 33 percent below yesterday's closing price on the New York Stock Exchange, and preferred shares, the company said in a statement today

Bravo!

It will be interesting to see how long this infusion will last......

Bleibt abzuwarten wie lange diese Kapitalspritze vorhalten wird......

Bring On The Fire Sales....Whistlejacket one day from MTN default

Finally..... Somebody has to start..... Maybe someone should have told them that it isn´t a good strategy to fund long term maturities with short term debt..... If you combine this with leverage and often enough "questionable" assets you have a recipe for disaster.....

Hat ja auch lange genug gedauert..... Einer muß ja den Anfang machen..... Evtl. hätte denen mal einer sagen sollen das es selten gut geht langlaufende Anlagen mit kurzfristiegn Schulden zu finanzieren....... Wenn man das ganze dann auch noch mit einem zusätzlichen Hebel und häufig genug "fragwürdigen" Papieren mixt bekommt man unweigerlich einne wenig erfolgversprechende Mixtur ( fragt nach bei bei der IKB, West LB, Bayern LB, Sachen LB etc ).....

FT Alphaville So either they couldn’t make it work, or in the end they didn’t want to. Nine days ago, Standard Chartered withdrew the liquidity support promised (conditionally) to its $7bn Whistlejacket SIV, after the vehicle breached its net asset value trigger, and appointed a receiver, Deloitte.

The U-turn by the bank raised the prospect of the kind of rapid firesale - and subsequent contagion through spread-widening across the SIV sector - that banks such as HSBC and Citi have moved to avoid by taking their respective vehicles onto their balance sheets.

On Wednesday, though, Standard Chartered withdrew the proposals it had made to Deloitte to help avoid a wind down of Whistlejacket and expressed its disappointment that it had been “unable to find a viable solution to ensure flexibility for Whistlejacket due to these changes in circumstances.”

This is as a result of a number of factors, including the pace of continuing deterioration in the market for certain asset classes and the impracticality of completing any proposal within the confines of the receivership as it has evolved.

Oh dear. This looks doubly bad. Whistlejacket tripped its trigger because the value of its assets fell below 95 per cent of par - or 50 per cent of the face value of the notes after leverage - triggering automatic receivership and liquidation.
Standard Chartered was thought to have made two offers to Deloitte. Firstly that it could buy Whistlejacket’s assets as they mature and transfer them to a separate vehicle, which it would manage. That though is rather the status quo - and as asset values continue to fall would presumably merely transfer the problem to a new structured vehicle.

> BRILLIANT.......

The second option was that it could buy all of Whistlejacket’s assets at current market prices, which would allow investors to realise what remains of their investments and get them more than in the event of a firesale, but would presumably leave Standard Chartered entirely exposed to the downside of those assets going forwards.

Either way, continuing rapid falls in asset values was going to prove problematic. Moody’s latest update on the SIV sector in January showed how average NAVs had fallen precipitously, the average reaching 52.6 per cent last November. The deterioration has continued apace since then.

While Deloitte say that a firesale is not an option (”absolutely categorically no need“), and that is still seeking other solutions, time is getting tight. The receiver elected last Friday not to pay the medium term notes maturing that day. S&P lowered its rating on the notes to CCC-, and its issuer rating on Whistlejacket, as a result - and said that as the notes have a three-day grace period payment default will take place on Thursday 21. Or tomorrow.

> It looks like the statement via Ft Alphaville SIVs don’t rollover, they die isn´t far off the mark....... And the chart might give an impression what still needs to be refinanced......

> Es sieht so aus als wenn die Aussage von Ft AlphavilleSIVs don’t rollover, they die das ganze recht treffend zusammenfaßt.....Der nachfolgende Chart gibt einen ganz nettenn Überblick über die kommende Refinanzierungswelle die mehr denn je in den Sternen steht......

SIVs don’t rollover, they die

Bring on the fire sales ...This should be very bad news for banks that have sponsored these off balance sheet vehicles with funding guarantees...... If they want to avoid the fire sales they need strong balance sheets to shoulder the reintegration..... Ask Citigroup ,IKB , Sachsen LB & Co ....... Once again a big hat tip to FT Alpahville ( see Blogroll )

Notverkäufe ohne Ende..... Das sollte besonders für die Banken unangenehm werden die gr´ßzügig Finanzierungsgarantien für diese Vehikel ausserhalb der Bilanz gegeben haben. Um einen Notverkauf zu verhindern hilft nur noch diese Papiere in die eigenen Bilanzen zu nehmen...... Fraglich ob alle Bilanzen stark genug siind um das zu schultern.....Fragt mal bei der Citigroup, IKB , Sachsen LB usw nach .....Einmal mehr ein dickes Lob an FT Alphaville ( siehe Blogroll)

SIVs don’t rollover, they die FT Alphaville

A quick update on the troubled SIV sector.

The average NAV (net asset value - a ratio of asset-worth to notes after leverage) for SIVs is now hovering just above the 50 per cent mark. According to Moody’s:

A vehicle’s net asset value of capital (NAV) is computed as the difference between the market value of its asset portfolio and the notional outstanding of its senior liabilities, expressed as a percentage of paid-in capital. NAV evolution since 2002 is shown in Chart 2. Sector NAV was above par for most of this period, falling below par in early August 2007 and then declining precipitously to 53% on November 30.

An average NAV that low is very worrying - since in generic SIV structuring terms, a fall below 50 per cent triggers a mandatory and immediate liquidation of the portfolio. Most SIVs are already in defeasance - having broken their “early warning” triggers (NAV at 75 per cent, for example). Moody’s again:

NAVs vary from SIV to SIV primarily as a function of portfolio composition. While SIVs and SIV-lites with relatively large concentrations of Non-Prime US RMBS and ABS CDOs show NAVs below 50%, vehicles with no subprime or ABS CDO exposures have NAVs that are closer to 77% as shown in Table 3. The ongoing liquidity crisis has however demonstrated that NAVs can be affected by spread widening in sectors that are not directly related to US subprime mortgages; thus, vehicles with currently high NAVs may also see sharp declines as contagion spreads across different segments of the credit markets.

(It’s disturbing to note that Moody’s are expecting contagion to spread with some certainty.)

> :-)!

For some SIVs, even a NAV at 53 per cent looks attractive (again via Moody’s):

Today’s rating action is prompted by the decline of Duke Funding’s capital net asset value from 21% on November 23rd 2007 to below zero on January 11th 2008.

This followed the declaration of an Event of Default by Duke Funding on December 6th, 2007. As a consequence of both the NAV decline and the occurrence of an Event of Default, one of the counterparties to the repurchase agreements, holding 8% of the portfolio, has exercised its right to liquidate assets. The remaining four counterparties, holding 92% of the portfolio, have agreed to forebear such liquidation rights on a temporary basis.

We’re now looking at a swift - and potentially market wide - liquidation of SIV portfolios. Possibly along Duke Funding lines. Low NAVs coupled with a spike in maturing SIV debt this January will likely make SIV sponsors - mostly banks - cave into the inevitable and call time. Banks simply can’t afford to keep on rolling-over SIV debt.

Brace yourselves: S&P adjusts risk models

This is big big news! It was about time..... Big hat tip to FT Alphaville for bringing this up!

Wurde auch höchste Zeit..... Großen Dank mal wieder an FT Alphaville für das hervorkramen dieser wirklich weitreichenden News!


Brace yourselves: S&P adjusts risk models
Late last night, rating agency Standard & Poor’s did some quiet housekeeping.

In a late press release, S&P announced it was adjusting its cumulative loss measure on 2006 subprime collateral to 19 per cent - up from 14 per cent:

We revised our expected losses for the 2006 vintage subprime collateral to 19% from 14%, as delinquencies continue to rise, and we will recalculate lifetime loss expectations for all vintages of U.S. RMBS. Additional losses are projected to result directly for the additional delinquencies and defaults.

The press release is somewhat anodyne, but the implications of that tweak are disturbing:

It will mean huge new downgrades on CDO tranches from the 2005 vintage through to 2007 - the majority of the market, in other words.

We suspect this will push hundreds more CDOs through “events of default” and a significant number into liquidation - a likely repeat of the disastrous events in November and December, when CDOs went into meltdown and banks were forced to admit further humiliating writedowns.

S&P are also altering their metrics; RMBS rating models will now apply the adjusted cumulative loss measure over the lifetime of the structures they rate - not just (as has hitherto been the case) over a 36-month period. That will likely make senior CDO investors more keen to liquidate deals: super senior swap holders, or AAA note holders in many CDOs have thus far been keen to accelerate but not liquidate the transactions on the basis that things will inevitably improve. The new model suggests they wont: controlling note holders now have every incentive to exit fast.

The crisis won’t just be restricted to CDOs. Any structure containing RMBS will suffer; SIVs, ABCP conduits, even plain old securitisations.

And it might be the final nail in the coffin for the monolines - MBIA and Ambac. Both have maintained their crucial AAA issuer ratings by the skin of their teeth, having raised $2bn each in emergency capital to act as collateral. S&P’s metric readjustment means that the monoline stress-test they performed is now outmoded and over-optimistic.

What remains to be seen now is when those calculations will feed through into a cataract of rating actions.

> Speaking of AMBAC.......

Ambac Will Cut Dividend, Raise $1 Billion to Preserve Rating

Jan. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Ambac Financial Group Inc., the second-largest bond insurer, will slash its dividend 67 percent and raise more than $1 billion in new capital to preserve its AAA credit rating.

Chief Executive Officer Robert Genader will leave the company, New York-based Ambac said today in a statement distributed by Business Wire. Ambac will reduce the value of securities it guarantees by as much as $3.5 billion. The quarterly dividend will be cut to 7 cents a share from 21 cents.

Multiple Fire Sales At UBS After $ 10 Billion Write Down

Looks like the UBS comment from just a few weeks ago in UBS Write Down Estimates "Best Case $ 6 Billion, Worst Case.... that the write down´won´t be big was quite an understatement..... Will be fun to watch how long the term "maximum clarity" will be up to date this time ;-) . I´m pretty sure that the same survey about bonuses for the UBS will bring less "euphoric" results..... It´s about time to learn the new version of the Investment banking lexicon: The post-credit squeeze edition. HILARIOUS!

Sieht ganz so aus als wenn der Kommentar der UBS in UBS Write Down Estimates "Best Case $ 6 Billion, Worst Case.... das die Abschreibungen nicht "wesentlich" sein werden ein wenig untertrieben gewesen ist. Welch Überraschung..... Wird spannend zu sehen sein wie lange die Haltwertzeit der "maximum clarity" in diesem Falle vorhalten wird ;-) . Ich bin mir ziemlich sicher das die gleiche Umfrage zu Bonuszahlungen" für die UBS weniger "euphorische" Vorhersagen hergeben würde..... Höchste Zeit die für die neueste Version des Investment Banking Lexicon: The post-credit squeeze edition. Köstlich!

UBS to Sell Stakes After $10 Billion in Subprime Writedowns
UBS AG, Europe's largest bank by assets, said it will write down U.S. subprime investments by $10 billion and raise 13 billion francs ($11.5 billion) by selling stakes to investors in Singapore and the Middle East.

UBS expects a loss in the fourth quarter, and may have a loss for 2007, the Zurich-based company said in an e-mailed statement today.

Securities firms and banks had announced about $66 billion of losses and markdowns linked to the collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market this year. UBS reported its first loss in almost five years in the third quarter after the subprime contagion led to about $4.66 billion in markdowns on fixed-income securities and leveraged loans.

Besten Dank an Zeitenwende

UBS Press Release & Deutsche Version
UBS strengthens capital base and adjusts valuations
UBS has introduced measures to substantially strengthen its capital position, adding CHF 19.4 billion of BIS Tier 1 capital. These include an issue of CHF 13 billion of new capital. This has been placed with two strategic investors: Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte. Ltd. (GIC) ( see GIC Website) with CHF 11 billion, and an undisclosed strategic investor in the Middle East with CHF 2 billion.


> To be honest i´m surprised that Singapore has two vehicles and that GIC has assets over $ 300 billion. I´ve heard so for only from Temasek HoldingsUnocal) in relation with Singapore. It´s very impressive that such a small country with an estimated GDP of $ 140 billion, a population under 5 million and especially without a resource base has managed to accumulate close to $ 500 billion in Assets Singapore/Wikipedia. Chapeau!

> Ich bin ehrlich erstaunt das Singapur zwei staatlich kontrollierte Fonds zur Verfügung hat und das GIC mit über 300 Mrd $ so groß ist. Ich habe bisher im Zusammenhang mit Singapur immer nur den Namen Temasek Holdings gehört. Es ist beeindruckend wie es ein kleines Land mit unter 5 Mio Einwohnern, einen BSP von knappen 140 Mrd $ und vor allem ohne Rohstoffbasis schafft fast 500 Mrd $ in Staatsfonds zu pumpen Singapur/Wikipedia . Chapeau!

At the same time, UBS has revised key input parameters of the models that are used to estimate lifetime default and resulting losses for sub-prime mortgage pools. As a result of these revisions, UBS will write down its US sub-prime holdings by approximately a further USD 10 billion.

After these actions, UBS projects a strong BIS Tier 1 ratio of above 12%. ...

In response to continued deterioration in the US sub-prime mortgage securities market, partly driven by increased homeowner delinquencies but mainly fuelled by worsening market expectations of future developments, UBS has revised the assumptions and inputs used to value US sub-prime mortgage related positions. This will result in further writedowns of around USD 10 billion, primarily on CDO and "super senior"1 holdings. In light of continued deterioration in the sub-prime market, valuations of UBS's remaining sub-prime positions reflect the extreme loss projections implied by the prices achieved in the very limited number of observable market transactions in US sub-prime related securities and indices up to the end of November.

As the basis for its wealth and asset management business, UBS wishes to maintain a very strong capital base under all circumstances. Growth in net new money continues, with inflows in Global Wealth Management & Business Banking totalling about CHF 30 billion in October and November. It will therefore strengthen its capital position by issuing new capital in transactions with strategic investors, by selling treasury shares, and by replacing its 2007 cash dividend with a stock dividend.

> Must hurt to sell shares at fire sale prices that they have bought back for a better use of their capital. In Q2 the stock price was in a range of 70-80 Swiss Francs, today close to 50 Swiss Francs. And in total they are selling 36.4 million shares......... Well done!

> Muß sehr schmerzen die teuer zurückgekauften Aktien jetzt zu Schleuderpreisen zu verscherbeln. Ironischerweise sollten die Rückkäufe seinerzeit ja die effektivere Nutzung des Kapitals ermöglichen. Im 2. Quartal lag der Preis zwischen 70 und 80 Schweizer Franken, heute nahe 50...... Und insgesamt werden knapp über 36 Mio zuvor erworbene Aktien nahe Tiefstkursen vertickert...... Gut gemacht!

Strategic investors subscribe to issue of CHF 13 billion of new capital
UBS has reached agreements with two strategic investors – GIC and one other – to subscribe to an issue of CHF 13 billion of mandatory convertible notes. This is subject to the approval of UBS shareholders at an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) which will take place in mid-February 2008. GIC has committed to subscribe to CHF 11 billion and the other investor to CHF 2 billion. The notes will pay a coupon of 9% until conversion into ordinary shares, which must take place on or before a date approximately two years after issuance. The proceeds of the issue will count as Tier 1 capital for BIS capital adequacy purposes after EGM approval.

Sale of treasury shares
The Board of Directors of UBS has further approved the re-sale of 36.4 million treasury shares previously intended to be cancelled. UBS has received indications of interest in a share issue, is considering these and will place these shares over time. This will increase BIS Tier 1 capital by approximately CHF 2 billion.

Proposed replacement of 2007 cash dividend by stock dividend
The Board of Directors proposes to replace the 2007 cash dividend with a stock dividend, i.e. a bonus issue of new shares. This will boost Tier 1 capital by CHF 4.4 billion, of which approximately CHF 3.3 billion is a reversal of accrued dividend for the first nine months of the year and the balance is dividend that will now not accrue. This is subject to EGM approval.

In total, these three actions, when completed and approved, will strengthen UBS's regulatory Tier 1 capital by approximately CHF 19.4 billion. After completion, and taking into account the expected fourth quarter loss, the firm's BIS Tier 1 capital ratio will improve to above 12% from 10.6% at 30 September 2007.

Marcel Rohner, Group Chief Executive Officer, UBS, said: "Conditions in the US mortgage and housing markets have continued to deteriorate, and we have updated our loss assumptions to the levels implied by the current distressed market for mortgage securities. In the last several months, continued speculation about the ultimate value of our sub-prime holdings – which remains unknowable – has been distracting. In our judgement these writedowns will create maximum clarity on this issue and will have the effect of substantially eliminating speculation. Together with the strengthening of our capital base this will allow us to concentrate on sustaining and developing our client businesses.

Information on GIC
GIC is a global investment management company established in 1981 to manage Singapore's foreign reserves. With a network of eight offices in key financial capitals around the world, GIC manages a broad diversified portfolio across countries and asset classes that includes equities, fixed income, foreign exchange, commodities, money markets, alternative investments, private equity, real estate and infrastructure investments.

More insights via FT Alphaville UBS boggles - $10bn of writedowns, $17bn in emergency capital

Fire Sale At Citigroup...Citigroup to Get $7.5 Billion Infusion From Abu Dhabi

When you have to increase your capital with your share price at multi year lows you know that they don´t do it for charity reasons...... Nice dilution but probably the only way to stay solvent..... Now it should be clear why they are still pushing for the "Superfund" . They are simply not able to follow HSBC. I assume this time there will be no congressional hearing related to sovereign wealth funds.......Nice to see that some "experts" still focusses on the dividend.... ;-). I assume this time even FOX Business News will get it right...... :-)

Kein gutes Zeichen wenn man sichn neues Geld zu Zeiten besorgen muß wenn die Aktien auf Mehrjahrestiefs notiert. Auf gut deutsch "Denen steht das Wasser bis zum Hals". Schöne Verwässerung für die Altaktionäre aber wohl die einzige Möglichkeit solvent zu bleiben. Nun sollte auch dem letzten klar werden warum Citigroup auf Biegen und Brechen den "Superfund" pusht und nicht wie HSBC diese Gesellschaften wieder in die Bilanz aufnimmt. Ich denke das es diesesmal kein Störfeuer von der US Politik geben wird....Besonders lustig zu sehen das einige der Experten sich immer noch mit der Dividende befassen..... Ich denke diesesmal wird sogar FOX Business News richtig berichten.... :-)

Nov. 26 (Bloomberg) -- Citigroup Inc., the U.S. bank searching for a new chief executive as it faces at least $8 billion of writedowns, agreed to sell as much as 4.9 percent of the company to the government of Abu Dhabi for $7.5 billion.


Citigroup will sell equity units to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority that convert into common shares, the New York-based lender said today in a press release.

``This investment, from one of the world's leading and most sophisticated equity investors, provides further capital to allow Citi to pursue attractive opportunities to grow its business,'' Win Bischoff, Citigroup's acting CEO, said in the statement. It helps ``strengthen our capital base,'' he said.

> It´s about time..... Wird aber auch dringend Zeit.......

Charles O. Prince III ( deaf & ingorant CEO Prince ) was forced to step down as Citigroup's chief executive officer Nov. 4 after the biggest U.S. bank said losses on subprime mortgages and related securities may cut fourth-quarter net income by $5 billion to $7 billion. The lender said at the time that it planned to shore up capital. The company's shares, which have fallen about 44 percent this year, sank to $30.70 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading today, the lowest price in five years.

Time for a review of the buybacks in 2006 Financial Highlights 2006 pdf

....our return of cash to shareholders through our $7 billion stock buyback in 2006 ( Stock was between $ 45 and $ 55....)

> Well done! Eine Meisterleistung!

ADIA, the sovereign wealth fund of the government of Abu Dhabi, is buying equity units that convert into Citigroup shares at prices ranging from $31.83 to $37.24 per share, on dates ranging from March 15, 2010, to Sept. 15, 2011, the U.S. bank said. The units will pay 11 percent annual interest.

> Here is a more detailed look via the FT Junk Citi

Citi is paying a higher interest rate than companies that borrow on the high-yield, or junk-bond, market; currently they pay roughly 9% for straight bonds. Typically, convertible bonds pay lower interest rates than straight bonds, although a particular bond’s structure could affect the interest rate paid......

Even after the spurious tax argument, it is difficult to see how this funding can be costing much less than 9 per cent.

Abu Dhabi, one of the United Arab Emirates, will have ``no role in the management or governance of Citi, including no right to designate a member'' of the company's board, according to the statement.

FT Alphaville has some more thought on The stealthy rise of the sovereign wealth fund

Von FT Alphaville gibt es ein paar mehr Gedanken zum The stealthy rise of the sovereign wealth fund

More insights from Mish , Naked Capitalism and the "Peter Schiff" of bank analysts Meredith Whitney

Risk rises of asset fire sale; signs ‘superfund’ has stalled

Some might argue that these are market and not fire sale prices......... But as long as they can convince the rating agencies and the auditors that their "models" imply a higher price.......

Einige könnten argumentieren das diese Preise dann Marktpreise und keine Schleuderpreise sind.... Aber solange es möglich ist die Rating Agenturen und die Buchprüfer davon zu überzeigen das die hauseigenen Modelle einen höheren Wert ergeben.......

Risk rises of asset fire sale; signs ‘superfund’ has stalled / FT
The threat of fire sales of mortgage-backed securities is mounting as rating agency downgrades have pushed debt vehicles into technical default. The prospect of forced sales comes as a US Treasury-backed plan for a “superfund” to buy up distressed mortgage securities appears to have stalled. S&P and Moody’s have received default notices for $5bn worth of CDOs, giving investors in senior tranches the right to sell assets.

The $75bn superfund plan - designed to purchase assets from distressed investments linked to banks and so prevent fire sales - seems to be stalled following the upheaval at Citigroup.

Cheyne SIV fails insolvency tests

I think lots of people are hoping that the ruling (see emphasized part of the post) won´t spread...... If you want to laugh or to shake your head in disbelief click here and read what S&P has to say about conduits and SIV just a few month ago.....

Ich kann mir sehr gut vorstellen das wohl einige den unterstrichenen Absatz basierend auf dem Richterspruch nicht sonderlich gerne sehen......Wenn Ihr ordentlich ablachen oder einfach nur fassungslos den Kopf schütteln wollt kann ich diesen Kommentar von S&P zum Thema "Conduits und SIV´s" empfehlen.....

Thanks to Jim Borgman

Cheyne Finance halts payment / FT
Cheyne Finance has become the first structured investment vehicle to stop repaying its short-term debt after the administrator of the troubled fund won court backing to declare it in breach of insolvency tests.


The move came as Cheyne Finance entered final negotiations with four banks bidding for its assets, which stood at $6.6bn (£3.2bn) at the start of last month.

The hold on repayments of the SIV’s commercial paper will hit short-term debt markets just as they had begun to show some signs of recovery from the ravages of the summer credit squeeze.

But Neville Kahn, a partner at Deloitte, the administrator, said the insolvency would not force it to sell assets at firesale prices and would make it easier to push through a sale.

“It will mean that we will get to a solution quicker,” he said. “We hope to have a recommended deal very shortly to communicate to creditors.”

The SIV still has $1.3bn of cash and could have continued to repay maturing commercial paper until at least the end of this month.

The administrator won backing from the High Court in a sealed judgment on Wednesday, said people present at the hearing.

However, the court’s interpretation of the insolvency test – using a balance sheet measure, in spite of the SIV’s cash pile – could prove controversial, as many SIVs would be insolvent if a similar measure was applied.

Mr Kahn refused to say which banks were bidding or at what prices, but said it was wrong to assume the holders of mezzanine debt – the lowest-rated tranche – would be wiped out.

That suggests holders of the top-rated commercial paper will be repaid in full, in spite of the insolvency.

Cheyne Finance, set up and managed by Cheyne Capital, the $12bn London hedge fund, is one of several vehicles either struggling to find new financial backers to support a restructuring or have triggered restrictions on their operations.

Two SIV-lites struggling to restructure have turned to Barclays for support, although Golden Key, set up by Swiss-run hedge fund Avendis, is in dispute with the bank about whether it has to repay a loan it drew down, reported to be worth $250m. Mainsail II, an SIV-lite run by London hedge fund Solent, had a rescue plan backed by Barclays turned down by investors.

In total, more than $42bn of assets in SIVs and SIV-lites are facing limits on their operations.